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ABSTRACT:
The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to
explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the
meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain
sentences, such as negative existentials (“Santa does not exist”), and sentences in contexts of
fiction (“Holmes lived on Baker Street”), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given
that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance
and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have
taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract
Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed
according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a
Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative
existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory
best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with
empty names in object-fictional contexts.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

How can we talk about Pegasus? To what does the word 'Pegasus' refer? If our answer is, 'Something,'
then we seem to believe in mystical entities; if our answer is, 'nothing', then we seem to talk about nothing
and what sense can be made of this? Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged
horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about
something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing.
–W.V.O Quine

I. Truth, Meaning & Aboutness
The problem of empty names is really an issue involving several interrelated concepts that
should be distinguished and clarified at the outset.
The main two concepts involved in our intuitions that give rise to the puzzle of empty
names are those of truth and meaning. Issues involving the former are brought out most
poignantly in the case of subject-predicate sentences, involving vacuous singular terms 1, which
we take to be true. Consider, for example, the following:
(1) Santa Claus can fit down chimneys.
(2) Vulcan does not exist.
(3) Romulus did not found Rome. 2
Sentences (1)-(3) are, intuitively, true. But this seems strange given a straightforward and
commonsensical account of the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘a is F’. It seems that a

1

A ‘singular term’ is any term that purports to designate some individual—paradigmatically, proper names like
‘John’, or demonstratives like ‘That man’.
2
At least, he didn’t do so by himself—he can take that up with his brother, Remus.

1

statement of that form is true if, and only if, ‘a’ denotes some individual that exemplifies the
property expressed by ‘F’. So, ‘Romulus did not found Rome’ would seem to be true when and
only when there is an individual denoted by ‘Romulus’, and this individual exemplifies the
property ‘having-not-founded-Rome’ 3 , and so on for the rest. But in these cases there is no
referent to be had. So how can we explain our intuition that these, and countless others like them,
are true?
Additionally, we have semantic intuitions to the effect that various sentences containing
empty names are meaningful. Consider again (1)-(3): They all seem meaningful, but it’s difficult
to see how they could be given at least two plausible assumptions about meaning. The first such
assumption has been called by those working in philosophy and linguistics the “Principle of
Compositionality”. This principle states that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the
semantic values of its parts (including connectives, such as ‘and’, ‘or’, and so forth). It would
seem, then, that no unique proposition4 would be assignable to a sentence like ‘Vulcan is not a
planet’, for example, if it lacked one of its semantic ‘inputs’—in this case, the value for
‘Vulcan’. Less technically, but still conveying the general idea, sentences such as (1)-(3) can
only be meaningful if there is something for them to be about, but given the subject-term’s
semantic vacuity, there is nothing for them to be about. Call this the ‘aboutness’ condition on the
semantics of declarative sentences containing singular terms.
3

Here the Platonic language of ‘exemplification’ is used for convenience’ sake, and will be throughout. It is not to
imply, though, that the truth conditions for such sentences are essentially Platonic—the problem here is about the
subject-term’s denotation, not about what, if anything, the predicate-term expresses. Consider that the Resemblance
Nominalist would face the same problem with the translation ‘Romulus resembles all things that did not found
Rome’, for there would still need to be an object denoted by ‘Romulus’ that bears this primitive resemblance
relation.
4
Throughout I will use ‘proposition’ to mean the semantic value of a sentence. In this sense, two semantically
equivalent sentences in distinct languages are equivalent in virtue of the fact that they “express the same
proposition”.
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The next assumption about meaning is one which connects it up with the notion of truth
in a fundamental way. The assumption is: A (declarative) sentence can be meaningful iff it has a
set of truth-conditions. Working from the left side of the biconditional, it appears obvious that if
a sentence is meaningful, then it has a set of truth conditions. Declarative sentences say
something about the world, and so it must be that there is some way the world would or would
not have to be in order for them to be true, and these of course are its truth-conditions 5. From the
left side of the biconditional, it also seems apparent that if a declarative sentence has a set of
truth conditions, then it must be meaningful. For indeed, how could we demarcate the sentence’s
truth conditions if we did not first understand what the sentence meant?
Now, some philosophers have attempted to make the connection between meaning and
truth close indeed. They have postulated semantic theories of truth, and truth-conditional theories
of semantics6. For present purposes, however, I will remain neutral on this7. It suffices for now to
point out that there is, at the very least, a relation of material equivalence between meaning (for
declarative sentences) and truth-conditions, if not a stronger relation, such as that of identity.
It can be seen, then, that the notions of truth, meaning, and ‘aboutness’ form a sort of
nexus of logically related concepts. Because of this, I will sometimes speak of meaning,
sometimes of truth, and sometimes of aboutness depending on the case at hand and the intuitions
5

The way truth conditions are characterized throughout this thesis is basically in accord with truthmaker theory:
There must be some state of affairs in the world, consisting of objects, that makes the statements true. Note, though,
that even if one rejected truthmaker theory in favor of a theory that did not make essential appeal to objects in the
world, the issues about meaning and compositionality would still remain.
6
See Alfred Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 4 (1944): 341-376., and Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” Synthese 17 (1967):
304-23. , respectively.
7

Most Direct Reference theorists, however, seem to endorse a Propositionalist account of meaning, wherein a
sentence’s semantic value is given by the proposition it expresses. Just what these propositions are meant to be—at
least those expressed by sentences featuring singular terms—is discussed in Chapter 2.
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involved. Keep in mind, though, that the other notions are always, so to speak, “in the
neighborhood”, and are not disconnected from the problem at hand.
I’d like to make one last remark regarding the differences, if any, between different
“cases” of empty names. The first and most general distinction to be made is between empty
names as they occur in negative existentials (statements denying the existence of their subject),
and empty names as they occur in normal subject-predicate sentences.
Negative existentials involve us in questions that go beyond those that arise from normal
subject-predicate sentences. Although both cases involve the aforementioned problems about
semantic value and truth, negative existentials involve us in metaphysical quandaries about
whether existence is a property of individuals, whether there in some sense are things that don’t
exist, and so on. Because of this, they present us with the most poignant, and the most
problematic, case of empty names. It may be that negative existentials and normal subjectpredicate sentences ought to be given distinct analyses in the end. We will see if this is the case.
The next distinction is between fictional and non-fictional cases of empty names. A
fictional case would, of course, be something like “Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street”, or
“Ned Stark does not exist”. The unique thing about fictional names is that we use them as
empty.8 On the other hand, non-fictional cases of empty names are cases in which we (at least
initially) do not use them as empty. So, for example, when La Verrier uttered “Vulcan explains
the perturbations in Mercury’s orbit” he used an empty name, but not as empty—although, we
later discovered that it was indeed empty, and this is where the “at least initially” qualification

8

I here demarcate fictional names as those we use “as empty” because I take it to be the thing that unites cases
occurring in novels, parables, games of make believe, and so on. However, this family resemblance of “using as
empty” is, strictly speaking, not always the case. See Chapter 3.

4

comes in. Once such a discovery is made, we may use such a non-fictional empty name as
empty, as in a negative existential like “Vulcan does not exist.” But this usage is parasitic upon a
prior usage of the name as non-empty.
As with the more general distinction between negative existentials and normal cases of
empty names, it may be that, in the end, fictional and non-fictional cases of empty names require
different analyses. This is, in fact, what I will argue. I’ll wait until Chapter 3 to elaborate,
however.

II. Background of the Debate
The problem of empty names has as its background in the more general debate between
Descriptivist and Directly Referential9 accounts of names. Taking center-stage in much of this
debate has been the case of vacuous names. As we will see, it in part motivated Descriptivism 10.
Because of this, it will be useful to briefly go over this background in order to put our present
discussion in its broader context.
As with the story of analytic philosophy itself, this story begins with the Austrian
logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege. In his “On Sense and Reference” 11, Frege set himself to

9

Direct Reference theory is also often referred to in the literature as ‘Millianism’—so-called after the philosopher
J.S. Mill, who thought the semantic value of a name was simply its referent.
10
The two other puzzles that motivated Descriptivism were Frege’s Puzzle (discussed in the following paragraphs),
and substitution in intensional contexts. An example of the latter would be a person’s believing that Mark Twain is a
great author, but not that Samuel Clemens is a great author. Given that ‘Mark Twain’ just means ‘Samuel Clemens’
(because they are co-referential), it should be impossible for a person to believe Mark Twain is a great author
without believing that Samuel Clemens is a great author. However, it does seem possible, and hence arises the
problem for DR theory.
11
Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1892): 2550.
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solving a certain puzzle about identity. The puzzle was this: Where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are both distinct
purported-singular terms, how can ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’ “differ in cognitive significance” 12, if their
meanings are simply their respective referents? Another way of saying this is that “a=a” is
always trivial, whereas “a=b” can be informative. For example, “C.S. Lewis is C.S. Lewis”
seems trivial—indeed, analytic. 13 However, “C.S. Lewis is Jack” 14 can be informative, and
seems “synthetic” 15 in some sense. How can this be, though, if ‘C.S. Lewis’ and ‘Jack’ both
simply “mean” their respective denotations? “C.S. Lewis is C.S. Lewis” and “C.S. Lewis is
Jack” ought to be semantically equivalent, but the fact that they differ in these semantical ways
shows that they cannot be.16
In order to solve this puzzle, Frege came up with his distinction between “sense” and
“reference”. The “sense” of a term could be identified with its meaning—thought of as a “mode
of presentation”, or way of thinking about, a purported individual. As distinct from this, the
referent of a term was simply, well, its referent. With this distinction in hand, Frege could
explain his puzzle about identity thus: “a=a” and “a=b” are semantically inequivalent because the
meanings of ‘a’ and ‘b’ are not their denotations, but rather their senses. Thus, something like
“a=a” will always be trivial, whereas “a=b” may convey information, such as “The sense of ‘C.S.
Lewis’ and the sense of ‘Jack’ have the same referent”.

12

This is Frege’s terminology.
Here I use “analytic” in Kant’s sense—note, however, that the very notion of analyticity becomes debatable on a
Direct Reference view. If we take the notion to essentially involve the concept of the a priori, then post-Kripke we
must abandon the idea that there can be analytic statements featuring singular terms or natural kind terms. See
Kripke’s discussion of a posteriori necessity in Naming and Necessity.
14
‘Jack’ being what Lewis’s friends called him, so I’ve heard.
15
In Kant’s sense.
16
Frege’s Puzzle presents an independent problem for Direct Reference theory, beyond the scope of this thesis.
13
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More important for our present purposes, however, was that the sense-reference
distinction also allowed Frege to explain our semantic problem about empty names: A statement
such as “Santa Claus is a jolly, red-cheeked saint” can be meaningful in spite of the referential
vacuity of “Santa Claus”—it still has a semantic value, identified with its Fregean sense.
Bertrand Russell developed a theory similar to Frege’s, but which was more formally
worked-out and avoided some of its pitfalls 17. In his classic “On Denoting”18, Russell argued that
the surface grammatical form of statements of the kind “The F is G” (so-called “definite
descriptions”) was misleading. Although they appeared to essentially involve picking out a
definite individual and proceeding to predicate something of it, their “true logical form” revealed
otherwise: In reality, they were general statements about whether a certain set of properties was
or was not satisfied. Let’s begin with Russell’s general, formal analysis and then see how it
applies to particular cases. Under his Theory of Descriptions, as it came to be called, a statement
of the form “The F is G” could be analyzed as being equivalent to the following:
(R)

Ǝx(Fx ˄ (y)(Fy→y=x) ˄ Gx)19

This analysis allowed Russell to deal with empty names by, to reiterate, making statements that
appeared to pick out an individual and say something of it, into statements that merely said of
some set of properties whether it was or was not satisfied. Let’s see how R would analyze, for
example, statements (2) and (3) above. For brevity’s sake, let’s simply represent whatever

17

For example, many have found it unclear just what Frege’s “senses” were supposed to be. Assumedly some sort of
abstract object—a pitfall, at least, for those nominalists who wish to avoid abstracta at all costs.
18
Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind 14 (1905): 479-493.
19

Informally: There is some x that is F, and for anything y, if y is F, then y is identical to x, and x is G. The ‘for
anything y, if y is F, then y is identical to x’ gives the uniqueness condition meant to capture the sense that a
denoting phrase such as ‘The F’ is meant to designate some unique, particular individual.
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properties we typically associate uniquely with Romulus as the predicate ‘Rom’, and those
associated with Vulcan ‘Vulc’. Further, let’s represent the predicate ‘founded Rome’ with ‘F’.
(2) and (3) then receive the following analyses on R:
(2’) ~Ǝx(Rom(x) ˄ (y)(Rom(y)→y=x) ˄ Fx)
(3’) ~Ǝx(Vulc(x))
(2’) remains meaningful, and true, because it simply states that there is no unique thing
exemplifying the properties expressed by ‘Rom’ and exemplifying the property of founding
Rome (in this case, simply because there is no such entity satisfying ‘Rom’ 20 ). (2) is
true/meaningful for the same reason, although it is simply a denial that any individual
exemplifies ‘Vulc’ 21 . It can thus be seen how Descriptivism neatly dealt with both normal
subject-predicate occurrences of empty names, and negative existentials.
This, then, was the broadly ‘Descriptivist’ solution to the puzzles about empty names. In
the 1970’s, however, the whole Descriptivist picture was, many philosophers came to agree,
refuted by a series powerful anti-Descriptivist arguments—beginning with Saul Kripke’s Naming

20

As Russell pointed out, however, a statement such as ‘Romulus did not found Rome’ is ambiguous between a
‘narrow-scope’ and a ‘wide-scope’ reading of the negation operator. The wide-scope reading is that given in (2’),
whereas the narrow-scope reading gives us: Ǝx(Rom(x) ˄ (y)(Rom(y)→y=x ˄ ~Fx). In this case, the negation
operator takes scope over the predicate, rather than the whole sentence. The wide-scope reading is merely the
subaltern of ‘Romulus founded Rome’, whereas the narrow-scope reading gives us the genuine contradictory of
‘Romulus founded Rome’.
21
And thus doesn’t involve us in the aforementioned scope ambiguity, for what could the narrow-scope reading
mean in such a case? That there exists something which lacks the property of existence?
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and Necessity lectures 22 , and subsequently continued in the work of philosophers such as
Putnam, Kaplan, and Donnellan23.
In Naming and Necessity Kripke leveled an all-out attack on any Descriptivist
interpretation of the semantic behavior of proper names. His arguments were numerous, but were
eventually categorized into two types of argument: one semantic, one modal.
The semantic argument ran as follows: If, say, ‘Aristotle’ just meant ‘the most famous
student of Plato’, then in a counterfactual scenario in which some other individual satisfied that
predicate, that individual would be Aristotle.24 However, this verdict is incorrect. The fact that
some individual might have satisfied all the salient Aristotle-properties would not make that
individual Aristotle. Descriptivism, then, makes the wrong predictions about who we would
mean by a name in counterfactual situations.
Now, the modal argument. Consider the following two modal claims (taking the
descriptive content of ‘Aristotle’ to be ‘The student of Plato’ for simplicity’s sake):
(M1) ~�~(Aristotle is not the student of Plato)25
(M2) ~(~�~(Aristotle is not identical to Aristotle))

22

Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity,” in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Gilbert Harman and Donald
Davidson (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972).

See, for example, Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ,” in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, ed. K.
Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975): 131-93., and David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” in
Themes from Kaplan, ed. Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977).

23

24

Indeed, we need not look to other possible worlds to see this—for it could equally be the case that, unbeknownst
to us, all of the descriptions we associate with a name are in fact false of that individual in our own world. See
Kripke’s Gödel example in Naming & Necessity.
25
The notation here is simply the ‘possibly’ of modal logic.
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Descriptivism, making ‘Aristotle’ equivalent to ‘The student of Plato’26, would predict that M1
is false! However, even the Descriptivist must admit that M2 is true. Yet how can she
consistently say this? On Descriptivism, M1 and M2 ought to be equivalent. Yet they are not.
Aristotle might not have satisfied ‘The student of Plato’, but he could not possibly have not been
himself. This demonstrates that Descriptivism gives us the incorrect analysis of modal claims
such as the ones above.
Kripke not only pointed out these problems with the Descriptivist analysis, but he also
gave us the semantical reason why such analyses failed. The reason, as Kripke put it, was that
proper names are semantically rigid designators. Rigid designators, Kripke explained, are terms
that pick out the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists. In
contrast, definite descriptions, those of the sort Russell attempted to make names semantically
equivalent to, are (in general) nonrigid designators: their referent could vary from world to
world27. ‘The teacher of Alexander the Great’, for example, will pick out different individuals
depending on the possible world being considered—many different people may have
exemplified that property. However, a name like ‘Aristotle’ is rigid in that, in considering
counterfactual situations (as we saw above) it will always pick out whoever it in fact picks out in
our world. Thus it is “rigid” in a way its associated definite descriptions fail to be28.
Due to arguments such as these, the Descriptivist paradigm lost its hold on philosophy,
and was soon replaced by the Direct Reference picture of naming according to which the
26

Again, this is for simplicity’s sake. One may substitute any of the common descriptions associated with ‘Aristotle’
and achieve the same result.
27
I say “in general” here because there are certain exceptions. For example, the definite description ‘the first prime
number’ picks out the same individual in every possible world: the number 2. In general, however, the descriptions
we associate with names are nonrigid.
28
The same point was argued to hold for natural-kind terms, such as ‘gold’ and ‘water’. For the locus classicus, see
Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”.
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semantic value of a name is simply its referent. However, although giving independent force to
DR theory, none of these arguments dealt with or refuted the original puzzles with assuming the
value of a name was its referent. Thus, it was left, somewhat awkwardly, at square one with
these problems, not the least of which was the puzzle of empty names. It became part of the
project of DR theory, then, to try and offer explanations of these puzzles consistent with its
claims about naming. And this leads us to the subject matter of the present thesis. There have
been a variety of strategies deployed and approaches taken in attempting to make DR theory
consistent with the phenomenon of empty names. The following chapters will explore these
strategies and approaches in detail, assess their strengths and weaknesses, and analyze whether
they give a generally successful account from the perspective of DR theory.

11

CHAPTER 2:
THE PRAGMATIC STRATEGY

We begin our exploration of the various approaches to empty names with the Pragmatic
Strategy. This approach has been developed by philosophers such as Taylor, Dietrich and
Adams 29 . Before discussing the Pragmatic Strategy itself, however, it will be useful to first
discuss two ideas essential to the strategy: Conversational implicature, and gappy propositions.

I. Conversational Implicature
The Pragmatic Strategy attempts to explain the apparent semantic content and truthconditions of sentences containing empty names by appealing to the notion of conversational
implicature 30. We may give an approximate characterization of conversational implicature as
follows:
(CI)=DF A proposition P is conversationally implicated by an utterance U in a context C
for an audience A and Speaker S iff P is not the semantic content of U but is understood
by A in C to be implied by S’s utterance of U.31

29

See: Kenneth Taylor, “Emptiness without Compromise,” in Empty Names, Fiction and The Puzzles of Non-

existence, ed. Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000)., and Fred Adams and
Laura Dietrich, “What’s in A(n Empty) Name?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004): 125-48.
30

H.P. Grice, “Presupposition and Conversational Implicature,” in Radical Pragmatics, ed. P. Cole (New York:
Academic Press, 1981): 183-97.
31
Grice’s implicature is more nuanced and involved than this rough characterization. However, following the
literature, I will assume that some sort of pragmatic process akin to Grice’s notion is occurring in the case of empty
names.
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To take some examples: Say Smith walks into the kitchen and says “Boy, am I famished!” in the
presence of Jones. Although the literal, semantic content of “I am famished” is simply that the
speaker be hungry, Smith has conversationally implicated to Jones that he has come into the
kitchen to find something to eat. That is, the proposition ‘I have arrived in the kitchen to find
something to eat’ was, in this context, conversationally implicated by the utterance of “Boy, am I
famished!” Or, again, say Jones says to Smith (sarcastically) “There is nothing I like better than
taking out the trash.” If Smith is savvy to Jones’ proclivity towards sarcasm, he will take Jones’
utterance to have conversationally implicated the proposition ‘I despise taking out the trash’.
Of course, propositions conversationally implicated may have various degrees of
relationship to the literal, semantic content of the utterance. Sometimes a proposition implicated
we would take to constitute what the speaker said or meant in the context. We would naturally
say, for example, in the example about Jones’ sarcasm, that what he meant in that context in
giving that utterance just was that he despised taking out the trash. There may be more distal
relationships, though, as when a speaker might say at a party “This party is packed!”, and
conversationally implicate a logical entailment of that sentence, “There are a particular number
of people at this party.” The latter proposition is not what the party-goer was trying to get across,
not what he meant, but is nonetheless reasonably taken by his audience to be implied 32 by what
he said.
Additionally, there may be propositions implicated in conversational contexts that are
neither what the speaker meant (or was trying to convey), nor logically entailed by what the
speaker meant. Say Betty says to Don, “Oh, Jeff just arrived at the party!”, and say it is generally
32

Here ‘implied’ is being used in its loose, conversational sense—not to be confused with the material or strict
implications of formal logic.
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known among Don and other locals that Jeff is, probably, the coolest cat at school. If Don
responds with “Well, now the party can start!”, he probably took Betty’s utterance to
conversationally implicate the proposition “The coolest cat at school has just arrived at the
party”, although such a proposition isn’t strictly entailed by “Jeff just arrived at the party”33, nor
should such a proposition necessarily be identified with what she meant (she may have not been
trying to emphasize Jeff’s coolness). It is this last sort of conversational implicature that will be
most relevant to the Pragmatic Strategy.

II. Gappy Propositions
The notion of a gappy proposition has been developed by various philosophers, such
as Braun, Taylor, and Salmon34. In order to understand the concept of a gappy proposition, it’s
important to understand what philosophers call a Russellian proposition. A Russellian
proposition is a proposition in which the object referred to by a singular term (proper name,
demonstrative, etc.) is itself a constituent of the proposition expressed by a sentence in which
such a singular term occurs. This idea can be made clearer if one thinks of it in the context of the
principle of compositionality: If it’s true (1) that the semantic value of a sentence is a function of
the semantic value of its parts, and (2) that the semantic value of a singular term occurring in a
sentence is simply its referent, then (3) it’s plausible that, in some sense, the referent of that
singular term itself features in the proposition expressed by such a sentence 35.
33

Though, given a Descriptivist picture, plus the assumption that this is all Betty associated with the name, such a
strict entailment would indeed hold.
34
See, for example, David Braun, “Empty Names,” Noûs 27 (1993): 449-69.
35

This is all somewhat vague language used in order to get across a rough and intuitive idea. It’s not as if it’s part of
the concept of a function in general that its inputs feature as “parts” or “constituents of” its output—or just what it
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Russellian propositions may be represented as ordered pairs of objects36—specifically, an
ordered pair consisting of an individual and a property. The Russellian proposition expressed by
a sentence such as “John Mcdowell is brilliant”, for example, is representable as follows:
(J) < John Mcdowell, brilliance >
Note that such a proposition isn’t a representational entity—it consists of no Fregean senses or
anything of that sort. Rather, it simply consists in the objects themselves.
With that in the background, we can make sense of the notion of a “gappy” proposition.
A gappy proposition is a Russellian proposition with an empty “slot”, so to speak. Taylor37 has
called such pseudo-propositions “propositions-in-waiting”: They have the structure of a
proposition, but are missing a semantic value—namely, the semantic value of the singular term.
A gappy proposition too may be representable, then, as an ordered pair; an ordered pair
consisting of an empty slot and a property. The gappy proposition expressed by a negative
existential like “Santa Claus does not exist”, for example, may be expressed as,
(S) < ___, nonexistence > 38
Or, perhaps more perspicuously, as,
(S’) < ∅, nonexistence >
It is such “incomplete” or “gappy” propositions that are the semantic (or perhaps pseudosemantic) values of sentences containing empty singular terms.

would mean for that to be true. Consider the function ‘f(x)=2+x’. If I input for the function ‘1’, it will uniquely
determine ‘3’, but it’s not as if ‘1’ is somehow a ‘constitutent of’ or ‘features in’ the number 3—whatever that could
mean.
36
Braun, “Empty Names”.
37
Taylor, “Emptiness without Compromise”.
38
This is just an example—the endorser of gappy propositions need not be committed to any particular view on the
status of existence as a property.
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Some philosophers have taken such gappy propositions to be truth-valueless 39 , while
others have attempted to make them truth-evaluable 40. Because in what follows it is the views of
Dietrich and Adams that will be primarily considered, it will be assumed that gappy propositions
are truth-valueless. It is important to keep in mind, though, that acceptance of gappy propositions
does not commit one to this view.

III. The Pragmatic Strategy Explained
One assumption that unites those who endorse this strategy is that, strictly speaking, a
sentence containing an empty name expresses no complete proposition. Such sentences are then,
at best, “semantically deficient”. How then are we to explain the appearance of semantic
significance and truth-evaluability? The Pragmatic Strategist offers the following solution: Such
sentences, although expressing no complete proposition, may nonetheless conversationally
implicate other fully meaningful, complete propositions. And, further, we confuse the semantic
significance and truth-evaluability of these implicated propositions with that of the sentence
actually uttered.
Additionally, Pragmatic Strategists have assumed that there are certain sets of
propositions that are, at least a majority of the time, implicated by the usage of certain names.
These have been characterized differently by different philosophers. Soames 41 , for example,
refers to such typically-implicated proposition-sets as the propositions “asserted” by the usage of
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For example, Nathan Salmon, Laura Dietrich and Fred Adams.
Braun, “Empty Names”.
41
Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
40
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sentences containing empty names. Taylor 42 has characterized them as conceptions of the
referent associated with a mental “file”, and Adams & Dietrich as the “lore” associated with the
name43. Following Adams and Dietrich, I will for the most part refer to such proposition- sets as
lore.
Importantly, the lore associated with a name is taken to be a set of descriptive
propositions, of the form ‘The F is G’. Given the widely-accepted Russellian analysis of such
definite descriptions, they can be meaningful even in the absence of a referent 44 (recall the
quantified structure explained in Chapter 1). This is important because only semantically
complete and fully truth-evaluable propositions could explain our intuitions that the utterances
that implicate them are, in fact, significant and with truth-value.
Here are some examples. Consider again our (1)-(3) from Chp. 1:
(1) Santa Claus can fit down chimneys.
(2) Vulcan does not exist.
(3) Romulus did not found Rome.
For the Pragmatic Strategist, (1)-(3) express no complete propositions. However, through
conversational implicature, the “empty-slots” where the names are in (1)-(3) get “filled in” 45 by
the descriptive content provided by the lore, thus generating implicated propositions such as
(1*) The jolly man from the North Pole can fit down chimneys.
(2*) The planet postulated in La Verrier’s theory does not exist.
(3*) The brother of Remus who was raised by wolves did not found Rome.
42

Taylor, “Emptiness without Compromise”.
Adams and Dietrich, “What’s in A(n Empty) Name?”.
44
For a classic objection to Russell, however, see: P.F. Strawson, “On Referring,” Mind 59:235 (1950): 320-344.
45
This is Taylor’s language.
43
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(1*)-(3*) contain no singular terms, and are meaningful in the absence of their referents, and so
express complete, truth-evaluable propositions. The Pragmatic Strategist claims that our
intuitions concerning the significance of (1)-(3) are really intuitions concerning (1*)-(3*), though
we mistakenly think they are directed at (1)-(3).
Note that the Pragmatic Strategist offers a uniform explanation of normal subjectpredicate sentences and negative existentials. Because of this, the approach can be seen as
neutral on the sticky metaphysical questions about existence. For example, it may, or may not be,
that existence is a property: For the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions of the form “The
F does not exist”, the question doesn’t arise. Such statements have the logical form of negated
existential quantifications, the negation taking scope over the entire quantified sentence. The
question of existence-as-property would only arise if one took the negation as an internal
predicate negation, which need not be done on a Russellian analysis. 46
There have been several important objections to the Pragmatic Strategy. In what follows
I will focus in particular on objections offered by Sider, Braun, and Everett47, as I take them to
be representative of the most powerful arguments against such a position. I will also discuss
replies to some of these objections given by Dietrich and Adams48. Finally, I will conclude the
chapter by giving my own analysis of the Pragmatic Strategy, putting forward some objections
and weighing the view’s theoretical virtues and vices.
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See footnote 20.
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From the following papers: Theodore Sider and David Braun, “Kripke’s Revenge,” Philosophical Studies 128

(2006): 669-682., and Anthony Everett, “Empty Names and ‘Gappy’ Propositions,” Philosophical Studies 116:1
(2003): 1-36.
48

Dietrich and Adams, “What’s in A(n Empty) Name?”.
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IV. Everett Contra The Pragmatic Strategy
One of the most powerful objections Everett levels against the Pragmatic Strategy is that
it fails to give the correct analysis of the “modal profiles” of certain sentences containing empty
names. Consider, for example, the following sentence:
(K) Remus is identical with Hilary Putnam.
Sentence (K) seems necessarily false: there is no possible world in which Remus is identical with
Hilary Putnam. However, if the Pragmatic Strategists are correct, and our intuitions about such
sentences are operating on the descriptive “lore” rather than semantic content, we should intuit
that (K) is possibly true. Hilary Putnam, for example, may have been raised by wolves and cofounded Rome with Romulus (adding to his already impressive credentials). And the problem
with (K) seems to generalize: Sentences of the form ‘N is identical with S’, where ‘N’ is empty
and ‘S’ full, are intuited as necessary falsehoods, whereas the Pragmatic Strategy incorrectly
predicts our intuiting their possible truth
Another objection Everett has to the Pragmatic Strategy is this: If there are pragmatic
processes in the case of empty names directing our intuitions at the lore rather than the literal
semantic content, why are such processes not operative in the case of filled names? Kripke et. al
have shown that they are not—the arguments in favor of Direct Reference are indeed based on
this observation49. It seems ad hoc to postulate such processes in the case of empty names but not
filled names, as there seems to be no in-principle reason why there should be such a divergence.
Here the Pragmatic Strategist may point out that such processes “turn on” only when we
recognize that the name is empty, but otherwise remain “off” (that is, our intuitions remain about

49

See Chapter 1.
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the literal semantic content). This, however, doesn’t explain why our intuitions regarding
sentences like (K) above remain stable even when we realize that one of the names is empty.
Further, it predicts the wrong intuitions regarding negative existentials. 50 Consider, for example,
the following negative existential:
(N) Santa Claus does not exist.
If the Pragmatic Strategy is correct, then our intuitions regarding (N) should be operating on a
descriptive proposition like
(N’) The jolly man who lives at the North Pole does not exist.
It appears, though, that even if one realizes ‘Santa Claus’ is empty (and thus accepts (N)), one
will still intuit that (N) and (N’) are not equivalent. We can see this by considering that our
intuitions will be that (N’) may yet be true, while (N) is false (Santa may have recently retired
and moved to the Bahamas, for example. Or, conversely, we will still be able to see, despite our
recognition that ‘Santa’ is empty, that (N) could be true while (N’) is false: It may be true that
Santa does not, in fact, exist, while it’s true that some other individual satisfies all of the “Santalore” (say, unbeknownst to you, your Uncle Frank). This, I think, shows that our Kripkean
“Direct Reference” intuitions are still operative on sentences containing empty names even when
we recognize that the names they contain are empty.
Everett further objects that there is the problem of “varying descriptive content across
speakers and times”. Assume, for example, that ‘Aristotle’ is in fact empty. Assume further that I
associate only ‘Teacher of Alexander’ with ‘Aristotle’, and a friend of mine, Jones, associates
only ‘Student of Plato’ with ‘Aristotle’. Despite the emptiness of ‘Aristotle’, and the fact that me
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and Jones associate different “lore” with ‘Aristotle’, it still seems that Jones and I mean the same
thing when we say, for example, ‘Aristotle is clever’. However, the Pragmatic Strategy should
predict that we do not mean the same thing: I mean (because the name is empty and the
pragmatic process is operative) “The Teacher of Alexander is clever” and Jones means “The
student of Plato is clever”. However, it will be clear to anyone observing Jones and I that we
mean the same thing, and it will be clear to us that we meant the same thing once we are made
aware (if we were not already) that the purported-referent of ‘Aristotle’ is the individual
supposed to be associated with both descriptions.
In addition, we may consider a single speaker who associates different descriptive lore
with a name across time. Say I once (falsely) associated the description “Star observed by
Einstein” with the name ‘Vulcan’, and say I now (correctly) associate with it the description
“Planet postulated in order to explain perturbations in Mercury’s orbit”. It appears that, in
deploying the name ‘Vulcan’ then and now, I used the name univocally. However, again, the
Pragmatic Strategy predicts the opposite: Because I associated different lore with the name at the
different times, and ‘Vulcan’ was empty, I should have the intuition that I meant something
different at each time. Our intuitions, however, are to the contrary. For example, I would have
understood at the later time that my former assumption that Vulcan was a star was incompatible
with my present belief that it is a planet—showing that my intuitions were that I had been
mistaken about an object univocally denoted by ‘Vulcan’, rather than that I had simply meant
something different at the earlier time. Everett considers a possible objection to this argument
that runs as follows: Although all of the descriptive content associated with the name is not
shared between the speakers, or across time, it nonetheless is the case that some of the
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descriptive content is. At the very least, the metalinguistic descriptive proposition “The object
denoted by ‘N’” is shared. If so, then (for example) Jones and I could have the shared pragmatic
semantic content “The individual designated by ‘Aristotle’ is clever”. Everett counters this,
however, by pointing out that this would fail to explain our intuitions regarding the semantic
equivalence of distinct names. For example, if a metalinguistic proposition like “The object
denoted by ‘N’” is at play in such cases, then we should have the intuition that “Santa Claus does
not exist” and “Father Christmas does not exist” are semantically inequivalent. But they are
semantically equivalent, so making the move to a conversationally implicated metalinguistic
proposition fails to account for such cases.
Finally, Everett points out the problematic case of names used by speakers where they
associate no descriptive propositions with a name. He gives the example of a person overhearing
a conversation between two people involving an empty proper name, say ‘Bill’, and then
proceeding to forget any descriptive content associated with the name, even the content “Person
whom x and y were talking about”. I may then use the name in a sentence, say a negative
existential such as “Bill does not exist”, and have an intuition (though I know not why) that it is
both meaningful and true. In this case, because I forgot all of the descriptive content associated
with the name, there is no lore that can be appealed to explain the fact that I take myself to be
saying something both meaningful and truth-evaluable. And yet, it is at least possible that I have
intuitions to that effect in such a case.
Everett considers some possible replies to this argument. One is, as before,
metalinguistic: I could at least mean, in such a case, “The referent of ‘Bill’ does not exist”.
Everett responds by pointing out that this would commit one to saying that every usage of ‘Bill’
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is empty—surely an unhappy consequence. To avoid this, our interlocutor may give the
following analysis: “The referent of my current utterance of ‘N’, does not exist”. Everett rejects
this as well, on the grounds that it would make my utterance of “N does not exist”, and the
original speaker’s utterance of “N does not exist” semantically inequivalent (because ‘my’ is an
indexical). It’s apparent, though, that both utterances would express the same proposition.
This concludes Everett’s main lines of objection against the Pragmatic Strategy. We will
now consider replies to some of these objections given by Adams and Dietrich in their paper
“What’s in A(n Empty) Name?”.

V. Dietrich & Adams Contra Everett
Dietrich and Adams (hereafter D&A, for brevity’s sake) begin their reply to Everett by
addressing the “differing lore across speakers and times” objection. It is claimed first that, in
general, there will be enough descriptive content in common between speakers or times to
preserve an intuition of sameness of semantic content. In those exceptional cases in which there
is not, D&A appeal to literal semantic content, the “gappy proposition” expressed by the
sentence, in order to explain our intuitions of semantic identity. So, for example, although Jones
and I associate different lore with the name ‘Aristotle’, it nonetheless is the case that we both
express the same gappy proposition in uttering (say) “Aristotle is clever” (the proposition
representable by the ordered pair < ___, cleverness >). And it is this that explains our semantic
intuitions in such cases.
D&A further point out that, typically, the only cases in which there will be radical
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departure between lore will be cases in which it is not, in fact, the same name being used. If, for
example, Jones and I’s conception of Aristotle differs on every significant point (say I don’t even
associate “famous thinker” with Aristotle, but only “peasant of the 12th century”), then it will
probably be the case that my usage of the name ‘Aristotle’ has a different causal-historical origin
than Jones’51, thus effectively rendering my usage of a ‘Aristotle’ a different usage, a different
name, than Jones’.
Next D&A reply to Everett’s “No Descriptive Content” objection (the case in which
we forget any content associated with a name, but nonetheless retain an intuition of semantic
significance and truth-evaluability in using the name). Here D&A divorce our semantic intuitions
from our truth-related intuitions. They claim that our intuitions to the effect that we’ve said
something true in deploying the name are based on a conversationally implicated proposition
such as (in the case, for example, of a negative existential) “The referent of my utterance of ‘N’
does not exist”. As was discussed above, Everett objects to this on the grounds that it makes my
utterance of such a sentence and another person’s utterance of the same sentence semantically
inequivalent, due to the indexical “my”. Here D&A claim that this intuition, and any other
intuitions of semantic equivalence, are based on the gappy proposition literally expressed by the
sentence, rather than any conversationally implicated proposition. So, in the case of truth-related
intuitions, our intuitions are operating on conversationally implicated propositions, and in the
case of semantic intuitions, they are operating on the gappy proposition literally expressed 52.
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The semantic theory of Direct Reference is typically coupled with a causal-historical theory of referring. See
Chapter 4.
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Note that this still commits them to the view that two speakers may be expressing different truths in deploying the
same empty name—this is itself counterintuitive, in the same way that we’re saying something different is
counterintuitive. In fact, it seems ad hoc to divorce our truth-related and semantic intuitions in this way. It’s
plausible that the meaning of a sentence uniquely determines a set of truth conditions.
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To Everett’s objection that we aren’t prone to conflate semantic content with pragmatic
content in the case of full names, D&A reply as follows: It is claimed that, in fact, we are often
prone to the same mistakes in the case of filled names—and thus, we may plausibly take the
same pragmatic processes to be at work. They give the example of an exchange in which a
speaker is using a proper name unfamiliar to his audience, say “Ronald Reagan”. If the audience
is unfamiliar with the name, they may ask “Who?” to which the speaker may legitimately reply
by offering a definite description: “Oh, the 40th president of the United States”. It seems, then,
that our semantic intuitions are often operating on descriptive content, even in the presence of
the deployment of a proper name.
Finally, A&D address Everett’s “modal profiles” objection. To this they reply by
claiming that it is in fact not pragmatic processes such as conversational implicature that explain
our intuitions in this case. Rather, our intuitions are regarding the modal features of sentence
schemas of the form “a=b”, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are proper names and ‘=’ is the identity relation.
Our intuitions regarding such schemas are that they are true if, and only if, (a) ‘a’ and ‘b’ are full,
and (b) ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same individual, and are necessarily false otherwise. So, in a
case where either ‘a’ or ‘b’ is empty, condition (a) will not be met, and so ‘a=b’ will express a
necessary falsehood. This is why, for example, we intuit the necessary falsehood of (K) above: It
is an identity statement involving two proper names, where ‘Remus’ is empty and ‘Hilary
Putnam’ is full.
This concludes Dietrich and Adams’ replies to Everett. We will now consider another,
distinct set of arguments leveled against the Pragmatic Strategy given by Sider and Braun in their
paper “Kripke’s Revenge”.
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VI. Sider & Braun Contra the Pragmatic Strategy
Sider and Braun (hereafter ‘S&B’) focus their attack on an account given by Scott
Soames in his book Beyond Rigidity53. Soames adopts the Pragmatic Strategy in that book, so we
may take their criticisms of Soames as a broader attack on any sort of ‘Pragmatic Millianism’.
Where other philosophers speak of the proposition conversationally implicated, Soames speaks
of the proposition “asserted” in a context. Further, Soames refers to the literal semantic content
of a sentence, as opposed to what it asserts (or implicates) in a context, as the proposition
“expressed”. For the present discussion we will adopt Soames’ language, keeping in mind that
the proposition asserted is the proposition conversationally implicated, and the proposition
expressed is the literal semantic content of the sentence (or utterance).
S&B’s attack, however, doesn’t focus in particular on the case of empty names. Rather,
they attack the general notion that our everyday intuitions about sentences containing proper
names will ever conflate the semantics of such sentences with the semantics of descriptive
propositions implicated by, or “asserted using”, such sentences. Such arguments should then, a
fortiori, be seen as arguments against the particular case of empty proper names. The cases they
do focus on, however, are cases involving propositional attitudes (belief contexts, desire
contexts, and so on). Recall that such contexts are, like empty names, supposed to constitute a
problem for Direct Reference accounts of naming54. The pragmatic approach is then typically
taken as a uniform explanation of all the “Fregean data”: Empty names, substitution in
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Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity.
See footnote 10.
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intensional contexts (especially belief contexts), and Frege’s Puzzle about identity. Keeping all
of this in mind, we will now discuss S&B’s arguments against pragmatic accounts.
The first problem S&B point out with a pragmatic account such as Soames’ is that it
allows for the possibility that certain modal claims be intuited as true, when they are
straightforwardly necessarily false. They use the following sentence as an example:
(A) □(If Aristotle exists, then Aristotle taught Alexander)55
(A) would be intuited as true as long as the audience “descriptively enriched” the name
‘Aristotle’ with ‘teacher of Alexander the Great’. Because the pragmatic approach entails that
our intuitions regarding the semantics of sentences in which proper names occur can operate on
the proposition asserted (implicated), as opposed to the proposition expressed (literal content), it
should be at least possible that there be contexts in which (A) seems true (for example, if
‘Aristotle’ were empty, and the pragmatic processes ‘turned on’). However, it doesn’t seem there
are any contexts in which (A) would be intuited as true. Therefore, S&B claim that Soames’
account “overgenerates” in allowing for such a possibility.
Next, S&B give a version of Kripke’s semantic argument against Soames. They ask us to
consider a scenario in which Gödel is about to give a lecture, and the host descriptively enriches
‘Gödel’ with “man who proved the incompleteness theorem”. The host then says:
(G) Gödel will speak on logic.
And, as in Kripke’s original example, it is in fact not Gödel who proved the incompleteness
theorem, but someone else—the infamous proof-thief, Schmidt. Given all of these assumptions,
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Soames is committed to saying that the host asserted something false in uttering (G). It seems
apparent, however, that he did not.
Here S&B make an important point that I myself will argue for and return to in the final
section of this chapter. They point out that Soames cannot appeal to the literal semantic content
of (G) to explain our intuitions, because this creates an “explanatory asymmetry” between
Soames’ account of differing cases of semantic intuition. In some cases, such as propositional
attitude contexts, Soames wants to appeal to the proposition asserted as opposed to expressed in
a context. Therefore, if he wants to avoid being ad hoc, he cannot legitimately claim that our
intuitions in the present case are operating on the proposition expressed as opposed to asserted.
Next S&B challenge pragmatic accounts on the grounds that they defy not only our
semantic intuitions, but also our logical intuitions. Given that pragmatic accounts claim that our
intuitions often operate on propositions asserted rather than expressed, S&B argue they should
endorse the following principle:
(P) Pragmatic Position on Logical Intuitions: Speakers intuit in a context that an
argument is valid iff the argument it asserts in that context is valid.
It makes sense that Soames ought to endorse (P), given that our logical intuitions concerning
what follows from what in a context will be sensitive to what we take the relevant sentences
involved to mean. Further, as S&B note, Soames ought to endorse (P) on the grounds that it
explains our intuitions that an argument such as the following is invalid:
(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies.
(2) Superman=Clark Kent
(3) Therefore, Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies.
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Principle (P) nicely explains our intuitions that this argument is invalid: Although the
propositions literally expressed in the argument make it valid, the propositions asserted make it
invalid (because, once descriptively enriched, it’s plausible that it’s not the case that
‘Superman=Clark Kent’). Thus, our intuitions with respect to validity appear to be based on the
propositions asserted rather than expressed.
However, S&B find this problematic. For it predicts that we should intuit the validity of:
1. Superman flies.
2. Therefore, the strongest man on earth flies.
We should intuit this as long as, of course, we have descriptively enriched ‘Superman’ with ‘the
strongest man on earth’.
However, S&B claim that one who endorses an account such as Soames’ may endorse a
weaker principle in order to avoid these consequences, which is given as follows:
(V) If speakers intuit in a context that an argument is valid, then the argument it asserts in
that context is valid.
The principle given by (V) avoids, at least, the problem with intuiting that ‘The strongest man on
earth flies’ follows from ‘Superman flies’.
However, S&B argue that even if one who endorses a pragmatic account accepts only the
weaker (V), she will still have a problem with certain arguments from ‘quantifying in’. And here
they give the following argument to illustrate:
1. Lois Lane believes Superman can fly, & Superman=the superhero.
2. Therefore, Ǝx(x=the superhero & Lois Lane believes x can fly)
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3. Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent can fly, & Clark Kent=the milquetoast
reporter.
4. Therefore, Ǝx(x=the milquetoast reporter & Lois Lane does not believe that x can fly)
5. The superhero=the milquetoast reporter.
6. Therefore, Ǝx(x=the superhero & Lois believes x can fly and Lois does not believe x
can fly)
Because of (V), speakers should not have intuitions to the effect that this argument is valid—
because the argument it asserts is invalid. However, it seems, despite the contradictory nature of
the conclusion, we will intuit this argument’s validity: If the premises are true, the conclusion
must be true. So here we have a case in which the antecedent of (V) is true, but its consequent
false: We intuit the argument’s validity, but do not intuit that the argument it asserts is valid.
Thus, we have a counterexample even to the weaker (V).
S&B’s conclusion, then, is that Soames’ account (and thus, for our purposes, the
Pragmatic Strategy generally) fails both to account for our semantic intuitions and our logical
intuitions.

VII. The Pragmatic Strategy Assessed
The Pragmatic Strategy will now be assessed according to its various strengths,
weaknesses, and theoretical virtues. First, though, I’d like to offer some criticisms of Adam and
Dietrich’s defense of the strategy.
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The first criticism I’d like to make is that their reply to Everett’s objection that pragmatic
processes aren’t operative in the case of full names doesn’t work. D&A argue that, in fact, we
can give examples of mistaking descriptive pragmatic content for literal semantic content in the
case of full names, and they give the example of asking for clarification when a proper name is
used to support this: I may say (where ‘N’ is a full name), “N is F”, my audience may inquire
“Who?”, and I may reply “Oh, the G” (where ‘the G’ is a definite description). This, however, is
an inadequate counterexample, for it assumes that the definite description is offered up as a
semantic clarification, rather than a mere reference-fixing clarification. As Kripke pointed out56,
definite descriptions do play a role in fixing the referent of a name, but they do not provide a
definition of the name. We can see that this is the case by considering that, if I proceeded to ask
of my audience “So, N could not have failed to be G?”, they would reply in the negative. So, for
example, I may clarify my usage of “Ronald Reagan” by offering up the description “The 40th
president of the United States”, but if I asked my audience “Oh, so Reagan could not have failed
to be the 40th president of the United States?”, they would probably reply “Of course not!”. This
shows that the audience is not in fact confusing the pragmatic, descriptive content for the actual
semantic content. Rather, they merely take the definite description to be a convenient referencefixer. So I think Everett’s point stands: Such pragmatic processes are not operative in the case of
filled names, and there is no in-principle reason that they should not be if they are operative in
the case of empty names.
Second, I believe A&D’s defense of the Pragmatic Strategy is ad hoc, for the following
reason: Whenever the Strategy fails to account for the linguistic data, they claim that our
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intuitions are actually acting upon the literal semantic content, or sentence schemas, in these
particular cases. For example, they claimed in the case of negative existentials that our intuitions
to the effect that such statements could be true/meaningful were based on descriptive pragmatic
content. However, in both the case of certain modal statements and the “no descriptive content”
case brought up by Everett, they claimed that our intuitions were acting upon literal, semantic
content (in these cases, the “gappy proposition” expressed). Why, though, should we think that
our semantic intuitions are switching back and forth between these two contents? Absent an inprinciple reason for thinking that such intuition shifts are taking place, this explanation is ad hoc
and brings a disunity to the account that should be avoided if possible.
Recall that Sider and Braun make a similar point regarding Soames’ account. With
statements such as “Necessarily: If Aristotle exists, he is the teacher of Alexander”, our intuitions
diverge from what the Pragmatic Strategy tells us—our intuitions are that such statements are
false, and necessarily so. And those who endorse pragmatic accounts such as Soames cannot
appeal to the literal semantic content in order to explain it, for it would introduce an “explanatory
asymmetry”. Because of this, I believe that Dietrich and Adam’s defense of the Pragmatic
Strategy ultimately fails.
The Pragmatic Strategy does have explanatory power over a certain set of sentences,
especially non-modal subject-predicate sentences such as “Santa Claus brings presents every
Christmas Eve”, and negative existentials like “Romulus does not exist”. The account, though,
lacks explanatory scope, for it fails to account especially for our modal intuitions, the fact that
the pragmatic processes don’t seem operative in the case of filled names, and the logical
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intuitions that Sider and Braun pointed out. For all of these reasons, I believe that the Direct
Reference theorist ought to look elsewhere for an adequate account of empty names.
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CHAPTER 3:
FICTION, PRETENSE, & FICTIONAL ABSTRACTA

As discussed in Chapter 1, the case of fiction appears to be unique in the discussion of
empty names, for in such cases we appear to be using the names as empty—as part of a story in
which it is the very nature of the name to be empty (though filled in the fiction). This divergence
from other cases of empty names may or may not require a unique account, and this question will
be explored in the present chapter. We will begin by outlining the two competing theories of
fiction: The Pretense Theory, and its main alternative: Abstract Object Theory57.

I. Pretense Theory
Our discussion of Pretense Theory will focus on the notion as developed by Saul Kripke,
although important contributors to the theory include Kendall Walton, Gareth Evans, and others.
I will now outline Kripke’s discussion of the view as laid out in his John Locke lectures58.
Kripke develops and defends what he calls the “Pretense Principle” for fiction. The
Principle states that, in contexts of fiction, criteria for reference, and in particular the semantic
criteria for naming, are just assumed to obtain. That is, it is part of the pretense that such
semantic criteria are satisfied59. So, for example, if the Direct Reference account of naming is
correct, it is part of the pretense of fictional uses of names that they simply refer. An important
57
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Although, as will be seen, one may consistently accept both relative to certain domains of discourse.
Saul Kripke, Reference and Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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Interestingly, Kripke takes this point to establish that fiction cannot be a “test case” for theories of reference or
naming.
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consequence of the Pretense Principle for Kripke is that, strictly speaking, no propositions are
actually expressed in fiction. Rather, there is merely a pretense that propositions are being
expressed. Thus, the pretense involved in fiction represents a unique semantic phenomenon:
When a name is used, or a proposition is (make-believedly) expressed in fiction, it is essential to
such usages and expression-attempts that they are merely pretense.
A further important consequence of the Pretense Principle, Kripke argues, is that it
implies that characters in fiction could not have possibly existed 60 . This follows from the
Pretense Principle when one considers the aforementioned point about fictional uses of names
being essentially a pretense. In order to motivate this point, Kripke asks us to consider a case in
which, for example, we discovered that all of the properties attributed to Sherlock Holmes in
Conan Doyle’s stories were exemplified by some English detective—and this independent of
Conan Doyle’s knowledge or intentions in writing his stories61. He then asks us: Would this be a
case in which we discovered that Sherlock Holmes existed? Given that the name was initially
used by Conan Doyle as part of a semantic pretense, the answer seems to be a clear “No”. It
might be a case in which it was discovered that some real English detective was astonishingly
similar to the Holmes of Conan Doyle’s stories, but it would not be a case in which Sherlock
Holmes (the name being used as univocal with Conan Doyle’s usage) existed.
However, Kripke does believe there is some sense in which we may have discovered that
Sherlock Holmes existed. It would not, however, be on the basis of a real person being
sufficiently similar to the Holmes of Conan Doyle’s stories. Rather, the sense in which we may
60

Salmon argues this as well, calling such names “strongly nonreferring”. See: Nathan Salmon,

“Nonexistence,” Noûs 32:3 (1998): 277-319.
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Note that this doubles as an argument against descriptivist accounts of naming in fiction.
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have discovered that Sherlock Holmes existed is if the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ was actually not
being used by Conan Doyle as part of a fictional pretense—say, if Conan Doyle was in fact
writing a historical narrative about an English detective he actually knew, and we, for whatever
reason, mistakenly took his stories to be fiction. But given that we are correct in our assumption
about the way in which Conan Doyle was deploying the name, there is no sense in which
Sherlock Holmes might have existed62.
We might conceive of pretense-propositions as being prefixed with a “story operator”63.
If so, Kripke observes that we can block certain inferences to the reality of non-existent
objects64. Consider, for example, the following:
1. Hamlet was melancholy.
2. Therefore, Ǝx(x was melancholy)
However, it’s also true that
3. Hamlet does not exist.
And hence,
4.

Ǝx(x does not exist)

The Pretense Principle allows us to avoid this unhappy consequence if we consider that
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Kripke says the sense in which Sherlock Holmes might have existed is an epistemic sense of ‘might have’. This is
analogous to Kripke and Putnam’s discussion of natural kind terms: Prior to the discovery that Water=H2O, there
was an epistemic sense in which we could have entertained the idea that Water might have failed to be H2O.
However, upon discovering the identity, we realize that such a scenario would be metaphysically impossible. In such
cases, epistemic possibility is not a generally reliable guide to metaphysical possibility.
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For a statement of this idea, see: David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15:1 (1978):
37-46
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A view commonly referred to as ‘Meinongianism’, after the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong.
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(1) is merely a pretended truth—that is, it is implicitly bound by a “It is true in the story that”
operator. If so, the move from (1) to (2) is blocked (unless, that is, (2) is seen as also bound by a
story operator). Further, the Pretense Principle allows us to see that the senses of (1) and (3) are
distinct: In (1) ‘Hamlet’ is used in the context of a story operator, whereas in (3) it is being used
outside the scope of the fiction, to say something of the fictional character that is not itself true in
the fiction (that is, it’s not true in the fiction that Hamlet does not exist. Indeed, Shakespeare’s
play wouldn’t have amounted to much if its protagonist didn’t exist in the story!). Under
Kripke’s account, then, this sort of argument for non-existent objects doesn’t go through.
Thus, it seems that Pretense Theory affords us both (a) a ready explanation of the
appearance of semantic significance and truth-evaluability in the case of statements in the scope
of a fiction, and (b) the theory, and its associated notion of story-operators, allows us to block
certain inferences to the reality of nonexistent objects. It should be clear, then, why such an
account has been attractive to many philosophers.
Some philosophers have argued, however, that the Pretense Theory cannot be the whole
story 65 . There are semantic phenomena surrounding fiction that cannot be accounted for by
appealing to “games of make believe”, pretense, or story-operators—and this observation has
been the main objection against Pretense accounts. It is these semantic phenomena that have led
such philosophers to endorse an ontology of fictional characters. This ontology, and the semantic
phenomena that motivate it, will now be discussed.

65

No pun intended.
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II. Abstract Object Theory
The idea that we must appeal to an ontology of fictional characters has been argued for
and developed primarily by the philosophers Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, and Nathan
Salmon66. We will focus primarily on their thought and arguments in what follows.
Both Kripke and van Inwagen make a distinction between so-called object-fictional
sentences and meta-fictional sentences (hereafter simply ‘o-fictional’ and ‘m-fictional’,
respectively). O-fictional sentences are statements made within a story—statements that, using
our former terminology, may fall within the scope of a “story operator”. The following are some
examples of o-fictional sentences:
(1) Frodo is on a quest to Mordor.
(2) Macbeth then saw a hallucination of a dagger.
(3) Buck heard the call of the wild, resounding from the forest.
Statements (1)-(3) are statements made from within the fictions themselves, and are thus “true in
the story”. Although the names they contain are empty, the Pretense Theorist believes we can
explain their apparent-significance by appealing to the fact that we merely pretend they are
significant—that it is part of the make-believe language game we are engaging in that they
express complete propositions. However, we may also make statements from without the story,
commenting on features of the stories and the characters they contain themselves. Such
statements are what is meant by a “meta-fictional” sentence. The following are examples:
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In Kripke, Reference and Existence, Salmon, “Nonexistence”, Peter van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 14:4 (1977): 299- 308., and Peter van Inwagen, “Quantification and Fictional
Discourse,” in Empty Names, Fiction and The Puzzles of Non-existence, ed. Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber
(Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000)., respectively.
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(1’) Frodo is the protagonist of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.
(2’) Macbeth is the most malevolent of Shakespeare’s characters.
(3’) Buck represents the primal nature of Man.
Statements (1’)-(3’) are not part of the pretense of the story—they cannot be prefixed by a story
operator, for none of them are true in the stories. Rather, if they are true at all, they are true
statements about reality, not about what’s true within a fictional or make-believe context.
Consideration of such sentences has led philosophers such as Kripke, van Inwagen, and Salmon
to believe that they cannot be explained by appealing to the notion of pretense or make-believe.
Rather, they must be explained in some other way; in a way that respects the fact that they
appear to be straightforward statements about the way reality is outside of the stories.
Because Kripke, van Inwagen, and Salmon all accept Direct Reference, and m-fictional
sentences such as (1’)-(3’) feature proper names, they have been led to accept the reality of
fictional characters. Such m-fictional sentences have the form of basic subject-predicate
sentences, having a proper name in the subject-position, and so (as was discussed in Chapter 1)
appear to have their truth conditions given by the subject’s having a referent, and that referent
exemplifying the property expressed by the predicate—and their semantics compositionally
determined in such a way that essentially involves a referent. If so, then if any such m-fictional
sentences are true or meaningful (and surely many are), then their subject-terms must denote
some object. This object denoted is a fictional character.
However, these philosophers have been quick to point out that their account is
emphatically not an account that commits one to the reality of the nonexistent. They are not
postulating non-existent entities that somehow have or encode the properties attributed to them
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from within and without the stories. Rather, they have conceived of fictional characters on the
model of an abstract object. These abstract objects exist, and are as real as any other existent
thing. Further, it has been argued by most of these “abstract object theorists” that these objects
are created by the authors who come up with the stories in which they play a part—or, relatedly,
that they “supervene” on the existence of the literary works in which they occur67. They are thus
contingent entities, unlike many of their other abstract counterparts, such as numbers or
properties68.
So here we have a class of sentences that prima facie contain empty names, and are
significant and truth-evaluable, but which these philosophers have argued do not in fact contain
empty names. Here, then, is at least a partial solution to the problem of empty names that is
consistent with DR theory: the apparent emptiness of the names is merely apparent—they do, in
fact, denote.
There is another, related class of sentences featuring names from fiction that such
philosophers have also taken as evidence for an ontology of fictional characters: Sentences
involving attitude-verbs, such as admires, worships, desires, and fears. Consider the following
sentences:
(1) I admire Frodo for his bravery.
(2) The Greeks worshipped Dionysus.
(3) I desire Juliet more than any other heroine.
(4) I fear Jacob Marley.
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Some fact or entity A “supervenes” on another B iff were there any change in B, there would necessarily be a
change in A.
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At least on a Platonic account of such entities.
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Taking such attitude-verbs straightforwardly as two-place relations between one who has
an attitude and one who is the receiver of an attitude, it seems that (1)-(4) commit us to the
existence of Frodo, Dionysus, Juliet and Jacob Marley, respectively. The following schema, for
example, seems to represent a valid form of inference (where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are individuals and ‘v’
is an attitude-verb):
1. a v’s b.
Therefore,
2.

Ǝx(a v’s x)

(this is simply an Existential Generalization on ‘b’)

For example,
1. I admire Jones.
Therefore,
2.

Ǝx(I admire x)

If this is indeed a valid form of inference, then it seems unavoidable that we should
accept an ontology of fictional characters when we consider sentences featuring attitude-verbs
directed at such characters.
There is, however, a classic objection to this sort of move deriving from the work of
W.V. Quine 69 . Quine argued that there are two distinct readings we may give a statement
containing an attitude verb. As per Quine’s original example, consider the following sentence:
(S) I want a sloop.
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W.V. Quine, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy 53 (1956): 185-96.
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According to Quine, (S) admits of both an opaque reading and a transparent reading, depending
on the position of the existential quantifier—if it has wide or narrow scope. Consider, then, the
following two readings of (S) (taking the attitude-verb ‘want’ to be roughly equivalent to
‘wishing that’):
(S1) I wish that: Ǝx((sloop)(x) ˄ I have x)
(S2) Ǝx((sloop)(x) ˄ I wish that I have x)
S1 is the opaque reading of (S), and S2 is the transparent reading of S. In S1, I merely wish that
some general condition is satisfied: That something is a sloop, and I have it. In contrast, the sense
of S2 is that there is some particular thing that is a sloop, and I wish that I had that thing. The
important point for our present purposes is that S1, the opaque reading, involves us in no
“ontological commitments”. That is, if we read S in light of S1, the inference from S to the
existential generalization “There is some x such that I want x” will be invalid.
Kripke, however, doubts that this really gets around the aforementioned arguments. He
points out, first, that we often do have some particular individual in mind when we have an
attitude toward it. For example, when I say “I worship Dionysus”, it doesn’t seem to be the case
that I am saying that I worship whoever satisfies some general set of properties—rather, I take
myself to be worshipping some definite individual 70 . Second, according to Kripke, Quine’s
analysis here only really works, if at all, for intensional attitude verbs. That is, verbs that don’t
admit of substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate 71 . Non-intensional verbs, such as
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It also seems strange to take ‘worships’ as a sort of sentential operator like ‘believes’ or ‘desires’. One doesn’t
worship that some proposition (this is meaningless), worshipping rather puts one into a relation with an individual.
71
Recall the example of belief-contexts. Although ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ are co-referring, it doesn’t
seem I can substitute one for the other in any sentence embedded in a “believes-that” clause and preserve truth.
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‘admires’ and ‘worships’ seem to always be directed at individuals, rather than expressions of
some wish or other attitude directed at the satisfaction of a set of properties.
The example of the statement “I admire Hitler” is given in order to get this across.
Consider that, if my attitude here is directed at some general features, call them the “Hitlerproperties”, then the following inferences should be invalid (because it involves substitution in
an intensional context):
1. I admire Hitler.
2. Hitler = the most murderous man of history.
Therefore,
3. I admire the most murderous man of history.
However, most of us would recognize this inference as valid. Anyone who admires Hitler
admires, even if they deny or are unaware of this characteristic of his, the most murderous man
of history. This shows that an attitude verb such as ‘admires’, or similarly ‘worships’, is
essentially an attitude directed at some definite individual, rather than at a set of properties,
Fregean sense, or whatever.
To take another example, consider the attitude-verb “fears”. Now, say that Little Johnny
fears the Devil. Even if Little Johnny believes all of the stories about the Devil (that he is King of
the demons, is out to tempt Johnny, and so forth), nonetheless his parents may truly report of him
“Poor Johnny, he fears a fiction!”. However, if the correct analysis of “fears” is given by, say,
wishing that some general state of affairs doesn’t obtain, or some set of properties is not
satisfied, this doesn’t make sense. It should be false under this analysis that Johnny fears a
fiction, because “being fictional” is not part of the content of Johnny’s fear. However, if it is
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some individual that Johnny’s fear involves, then it makes sense that we may truly say that he
fears something fictional, for “fears” would be a non-intensional verb relating two individuals
independent of the mode of description of that individual. 72
Another objection to Abstract Object theory has been as follows: Given that m-fictional
sentences are to be analyzed in terms of the existence of abstract objects, how do we make sense
of negative existentials featuring fictional names? If, for example, “Spock” refers to an existent
abstract individual, shouldn’t it be false that “Spock does not exist”? To this philosophers such as
Kripke, van Inwagen, and Salmon have responded as follows: In such instances, it is literally
false that such entities don’t exist. However, such negative existentials can be used to convey
some related truth, such as that “there is no person sufficiently similar to the character of the
stories”, or that the entity is “merely fictional” and not one of “flesh and blood”73.
We have now explored the outlines of two approaches to the case of (apparent) empty
names occurring in fiction: Pretense Theory, and Abstract Object Theory. Of course, the two
approaches are not mutually exclusive: One may, as Kripke and van Inwagen do, accept a
Pretense account of object-fictional sentences and an Abstract Object account of meta-fictional
sentences. However, one may also adopt a holistic approach, adopting one or the other
framework to explain all the data. This is what Nathan Salmon does, and his views will now be
discussed.
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Intensional contexts, and attitude contexts generally, are, however, controversial. The Abstract Object theorist
may simply avoid such cases and rely on m-fictional sentences to motivate their theory.
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See Salmon, “Nonexistence”.
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III. Salmon Contra Pretense
Salmon criticizes Pretense accounts on the grounds that they fail to account for a certain
set of o-fictional sentences, or o-fictional uses of fictional names. Consider the following:
(1) According to The Lord of the Rings it is true that Arwen is an elf.
(2) Martha believed that Ned Stark was a great hero of Westeros, not realizing that
‘Game of Thrones’ was mere fiction.
(3) Sherlock was cleverer than Russell74
Let’s first consider (1). If Pretense Theory is correct, according to Salmon, how can we make
sense out of such a statement? For, because no actual propositions get expressed by o-fictional
sentences but are only pretended to be expressed, there should be nothing that is true according
to LOTR. In order to make sense out of the content of that-clauses such as the one occurring in
(1), we must assume a proposition is expressed. However, Pretense Theory can provide us with
no such propositions.
The problem with (2) is similar: Given that there is, strictly speaking, no proposition
expressed by “Ned Stark was a great hero of Westeros”, how do we make sense out of the
content of Martha’s belief? What is it that Martha believes to be true if not some proposition
expressed by that o-fictional sentence? Pretense accounts, again, cannot offer us the requisite
content.
Now consider (3). It seems that, as it occurs in (3), “Sherlock” is being used as it is in the
context of the stories: To refer to an intelligent English detective. If so, it is being used ofictionally, rather than m-fictionally (when it would be used to refer to some abstract creation of
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This in particular is Salmon’s example.
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Conan Doyle’s). But then ‘Sherlock’ is in this case genuinely empty, so how can we make sense
of the significance and truth-evaluability of “Sherlock was cleverer than Russell”?
In order to deal with such problems, Salmon rejects (or rather “modifies”) the Pretense
Theory. He claims that we should not view fictional names as being ambiguous between an ofictional use and an m-fictional use, but rather that they univocally refer to the abstract object—
inside and outside of the stories. The difference for Salmon, then, between statements from
within and without the fiction, is that statements from within the fiction pretend that the abstract
objects referred to by the names possess every-day, non-abstract properties (‘being human’,
‘donning a hat’, and so forth)75. Outside the fictional context, this pretense is dropped and we can
attribute to them the properties that are “proper” to them qua abstract objects—like, for example,
‘being created by Author A’, and ‘being the most notorious literary character’. This deals with
the aforementioned problems by providing a semantic value, and thus complete propositions, for
o-fictional sentences to contain and express. There is thus a proposition that is true according to
LOTR, a proposition believed by Martha, and a proposition expressed by ‘Sherlock was cleverer
than Russell’.
There seem to be some initial moves available to the Pretense Theorist, however—at least
regarding sentences (1) and (2). The Pretense Theorist may translate them with theoretical
impunity as follows:
(1’) When engaged in the LOTR-pretense, it is pretended that “Arwen is an elf”
expresses a true proposition.
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To give a more mundane example of this sort of thing, consider the case in which a child acquires a pet rock. She
proceeds to name it ‘Don’, and feigns its personhood. Nonetheless, throughout this game of make-believe, the
referent of ‘Don’ is the rock, despite the fact that one of its essential properties in the game, being a person, is
incompatible with its actual nature as an inanimate object.
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(2’) Martha believes that the sentence “Ned Stark was a great hero of Westeros”
expresses a true, non-pretended proposition.
(1’) and (2’) commit us only to the existence of the sentences involved, and thus, by making such
a metalinguistic move, avoid commitment to any propositions. However, one possible response
to this move by the Pretense Theorist would be to say that it fails to account for certain
translinguistic facts. For example, it seems we’d want to say that two speakers could have an
identical belief that “Ned Stark was a great hero of Westeros”, even if one read Game of Thrones
in English, and the other German. However, the solution expressed by (2’) commits us to saying
they would not possess the same belief: One would have a belief about the English sentence in
the book, and the other a belief about its German equivalent in the book. This is a problematic
result76.

IV. Assessment
We have explored the two broad approaches to the case of empty names in fiction:
Pretense Theory, and Abstract Object Theory. These two views are not inconsistent, and have, as
mentioned, been combined by certain philosophers in order to explain the distinction between socalled ‘object-fictional’ sentences and ‘meta-fictional’ sentences. However, as also mentioned,
one can take a pure Pretense account or a pure Abstract Object account, the latter being
exemplified by Salmon.
The virtue of Abstract Object Theory is that it explains the semantics and truth-conditions
of meta-fictional sentences by simply denying the names they contain are empty. If they are not,
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then they are provided with their Directly Referential values: abstract objects that serve as their
denotations. Salmon argues that this line of thinking needs to be extended to object-fictional
sentences, but it’s unclear whether this is a good analysis, given certain prima facie plausible
moves the Pretense Theorist can make. Additionally, it seems a significant shortcoming of
Abstract Object accounts that they “analyze away” negative existentials: It seems there is some
sense in which it is literally true that, say, “Sherlock Holmes does not exist”. It seems, though,
that the Abstract Object Theorist must deny this by either (a) analyzing it as something like
“Sherlock Holmes is merely fictional”, or (b) taking the name in question to be given by a
descriptivist semantics. The former isn’t desirable because it loses the literal sense of the original
sentence, and the latter because it conflicts with Direct Reference.
Pretense Theory’s greatest strengths are in its ability to explain object-fictional sentences,
what sort of “language game” we’re engaged in when interacting with fiction, and in its ability to
explain why it seems fictional characters could not have possibly (at least concretely) existed:
Their use is defined essentially by its role in a pretense to reference, so there’s no possible nonpretensed propositions they may have been constituents of.
In the following chapter I will explore the various metalinguistic strategies that have been
employed by philosophers to explain empty names—and in particular negative existentials. In
the course of this discussion, Pretense Theory will rear its head once more, as it has been used by
certain philosophers—most notably Ken Walton and Gareth Evans—to try and explain negative
existentials. We will see whether it can provide any insight in these other areas as well.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE METALINGUISTIC STRATEGY

In this final chapter I will discuss the Metalinguistic Strategy—or rather, I will discuss a
set of related metalinguistic strategies. What defines a metalinguistic strategy is that it appeals to
linguistic or semantical items themselves in order to explain empty names 77 . Just what this
amounts to should become clear in the proceeding discussion. Further, it this strategy that I will
ultimately argue is the most successful, when developed in the correct way, in dealing with our
stickiest problem: negative existentials. Before beginning, however, I will briefly discuss two
ideas that will be key to the subsequent discussion. First, there is the distinction between “use”
and “mention”, and second, there is the so-called “causal-historical” theory of reference.

I. Use, Mention, & The Causal-Historical Theory
The distinction between use and mention is the distinction between deploying a term to
talk about its referent, and deploying a term to talk about the term itself. For example, consider
the following set of sentences:
1. Rolf is the worst person I know.
2. ‘Rolf’ is a four-letter word.
3. God is the creator of the cosmos.
4. I’m not sure what ‘God’ is supposed to mean.
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There have also been recent attempts to revive Descriptivism in metalinguistic garb. See: Kent Bach, “Giorgione
Was So-called Because of His Name,” Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002): 73-103.
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In (1) and (3), the names ‘Rolf’ and ‘God’ are being used, whereas in (2) and (3) they are
being mentioned. As can be seen, a term’s being mentioned is typically signaled by its occurring
within scare quotes, and a term is usually being used when it occurs without them. This common
convention will be followed throughout the chapter. Further, note that the most natural way to
think about mentioning a term is that, in binding it with scare quotes, one creates a name for the
name itself. So, for example, ‘Rolf’ is a name that designations the name ‘Rolf’.
Up until this point, we have focused only on the Direct Reference component of the nowdominant analysis of proper names. However, Direct Reference, being merely a theory of the
semantics of proper names, is incomplete. The semantics of proper names merely tells us what
the meaning-contribution of name is to a sentence in which it occurs. But there is a further
question: In virtue of what does a term refer to the particular thing it does, rather than another?
An answer to that question takes us beyond the purely semantical contribution of a name, and
into a theory of the mechanism of reference for names.
Kripke answered this question with what has come to be called the causal-historical
theory of reference. The causal-historical theory of reference says that a name refers to the
particular thing it does in virtue of an utterance of that name being a part of a causal-historical
chain, going back from speaker to speaker, to an initial “baptism” of an object with that name.
For example, consider the name ‘Aristotle’. A particular utterance of that name refers to who it
does in virtue of the fact that there is a historical chain of language users, each intending to use
the name in the same way as the last user, going back to a moment at which a particular child
was dubbed (“baptized”) with the name ‘Aristotle’. Note that, under the causal-historical theory,
names are individuated by the causal-historical chain to which they belong. Because of this, I
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may call both my dog and the Greek philosopher ‘Aristotle’, but they are in reality different
names—one is part of a causal-historical chain leading back to the Grecian man, and the other
part of a chain leading back to my dog. And, again, it is virtue of this fact that they have their
respective referents78.

II. The Naïve Metalinguistic Strategy
Metalinguistic approaches to negative existentials have often been criticized, indeed even
hastily written off, in the literature. However, I will argue, most such criticisms have been
leveled against either what I will call a naïve Metalinguistic Strategy, or a “meta-propositional”
strategy, instead of the more plausible and robust forms it can take. In this section I will lay out
what the naïve strategy amounts to and look at the main lines of criticism that have been brought
against it.
According to the naïve metalinguistic strategy, a negative existential of the form “N does
not exist” is to be analyzed as “ ‘N’ does not refer”. It is metalinguistic in that it claims what
appears to be a statement about an individual (in this case, saying the individual in question does
not exist), is in reality a statement about the referential vacuity of the name itself. ‘Jones does not
exist’, for example, will really be a statement about the term Jones, analyzed as “‘Jones’ does not
refer”. Note that this view has at least the prima facie virtues of (a) not committing us to nonexistent objects, (b) not committing us to any particular view of whether existence is a property,
and (3) not conceding any ground to Descriptivism.
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The conjunction of DR theory with the Causal-Historical view of referring is sometimes called the ‘New Theory
of Reference’. In contrast to this new picture, the Descriptivist view held that a name refers to the individual it does
in virtue of the fact that the individual in question satisfies the properties which are the name’s semantic value.
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This, then, is a basic statement of the naïve metalinguistic strategy for dealing with
negative existentials. As mentioned before, though, many philosophers have (rightly, I think)
objected to such a view. These objections will now be addressed.
Braun, in his “Empty Names”, objects to the view on at least two grounds. First, he
argues that if (say) ‘Vulcan does not exist’ were equivalent to “’Vulcan’ does not refer”, then the
following two propositions ought to be equivalent as well:
P1. If Vulcan does not exist, then ‘Vulcan’ does not refer.
P2. If ‘Vulcan’ does not refer, then ‘Vulcan’ does not refer.
But, as he points out, (P1) and (P2) are not equivalent. P1 is at best contingent, for ‘Vulcan’ may
have referred to some other object. P2, on the other hand, is necessary. This difference in modal
profile shows that these two propositions cannot be equivalent.
Braun further objects that, if this view is correct, it seems to imply that negative
existentials that contain different names cannot be equivalent. Consider P3 and P4, keeping in
mind that I was called ‘Pierre’ in my 7th grade French class:
P3. Ben does not exist.
P4. Pierre does not exist.
Assuming of course that my classmates knew, at least in the context of our classroom, that
“Ben=Pierre”, P3 and P4 ought to be equivalent. However, under the naïve metalinguistic
strategy they are not, for they are equivalent to:
P3’: ‘Ben’ does not refer.
and,
P4’: ‘Pierre’ does not refer.
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If these negative existentials are simply about the names involved, it doesn’t seem they can
preserve the semantic equivalence between P3 and P479.
Further, if a statement like “Vulcan does not exist” is truly equivalent to “‘Vulcan’ does
not refer”, then the following conditional should also hold:
(C) If ‘Vulcan’ does not refer, then Vulcan does not exist.
But (C) seems false: The name ‘Vulcan’ may fail to refer and yet Vulcan still exists. We need
only consider a possible world in which Vulcan is called something else, or called nothing, yet
which includes the planet Vulcan. This seems to be a clear metaphysical possibility, so again, the
equivalence between the negative existential and its naïve metalinguistic analysis cannot hold.
Kripke gives an argument in the same vein as these, but which is based on the idea of
“indirect discourse” about belief-reports. He asks us to consider (assuming that the
metalinguistic strategist will want to treat “exists” in the same way she treats “does not exist”) a
case in which we report a belief of the ancient Greeks: “The Greeks believed that Zeus existed”.
Given that “Zeus exists” is to be treated as “‘Zeus’ refers”, we must analyze such a belief-report
as: “The Greeks believed that ‘Zeus’ referred”. However, Kripke points out, this cannot be the
correct analysis, for we may correctly attribute such a belief to the Greeks without committing
ourselves to the Greeks using or even knowing about the term ‘Zeus’.
These are the main lines of objection to the naïve Metalinguistic Strategy. I will now
discuss what has been called the “meta-propositional” approach to negative existentials 80.
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By the principle of compositionality, one proposition expressed will have ‘Ben’ as a constituent, and the other
‘Pierre’—assuming mentionings function as names for names.
80
This is Braun’s terminology.
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III. The Meta-propositional Approach
The meta-propositional approach gets its initial statement in Kripke’s John Locke
lectures 81 . There, he argues that we should analyze “N does not exist” as “There is no true
proposition to the effect that ‘N exists’”. Under this analysis a statement about the nonexistence
of an individual is really a statement about the nonexistence of a certain proposition (namely, the
one that would be expressed by the positive sentence, ‘N exists’). And this accords with the DR
theorist’s acceptance of Russellian propositions: If a name has no referent, and hence no
semantic value, then there will be no (complete) proposition expressed by any sentence in which
it occurs. So it does seem true that, at least, any genuine negative existential entails the
nonexistence of propositions that may have been expressed by sentences in which the requisite
name occurs.
Kripke observes that such a view also commits us to an extended notion of falsity.
Typically, we take a sentence to be false (or its negation true) if that sentence expresses a false
proposition. However, if the present analysis is correct, the positive existence claim is false
precisely because it expresses no proposition. That is, “N does not exist” is true in virtue of the
fact that “N exists” expresses no proposition.
Salmon objects to this view on the grounds that it “attempts to explain one negative
existential in terms of another” 82 , and thus generates a sort of vicious regress. We can see
Salmon’s point if we consider closely the equivalence between the following two propositions:
(1) Julius does not exist.
(2) The proposition that ‘Julius exists’ does not exist.
81
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Kripke, Reference and Existence.
Salmon, “Nonexistence”.
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The analysis given by (2) does seem to accurately capture how Kripke’s meta-propositional view
would handle (1). If so, Salmon would argue that it just has introduced a new negative existential
in need of analysis: “The proposition that ‘Julius exists’ does not exist”. This seems to me an
inadequate objection, however. For consider the semantic difference between (1) and (2): (1)
contains a proper name, and so by DR theory and the Principle of Compositionality, generates all
of the problems we have been addressing. (2), however, appears to be a definite description of
the form “The F is G”. If so, then it can straightforwardly receive its quantificational Russellian
analysis, and no problem is generated. (2) would plausibly be equivalent to:
~Ǝx(x is a proposition & x is expressed by ‘Julius exists’)
The key point here is that “The proposition that P” is not a singular term, but rather a descriptive
phrase that we may take to be individuated by its being that possible proposition expressed by
the sentence “Julius exists”83. Under the Russellian analysis just given, we are simply denying
that there is some proposition satisfying that description. Ultimately, then, I do not find Salmon’s
objection to Kripke compelling.
It seems, however, that some of the aforementioned objections against the naïve view
may here return to haunt us. For consider that, if these nonexistent propositions are individuated
by the sentences they might have been the semantic value for, then we once again are faced with
the following problem: Negative existentials in different languages, or featuring different names,
that are semantically equivalent will be predicted to be semantically inequivalent. To see this,
consider again the analysis just given of “Julius does not exist”:
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Kripke does not explicitly say that such nonexistent propositions would be individuated by the sentences that
purportedly express them. However, I think, this is the only plausible interpretation of their individuation conditions.
The “to the effect that” clause in Kripke’s meta-proposition cannot, of course, be embedding the proposition it’s
claiming the nonexistence of—so, it must be embedding the sentence.
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~Ǝx(x is a proposition & x is expressed by ‘Julius exists’)
Now consider a scenario in which someone else knows this purported-individual Julius only
under the name ‘Maximus’. Further, assume that both speakers involved make the following true
utterances: “Julius does not exist” and “Maximus does not exist”. It is plausible to assume that, if
‘Julius’ and ‘Maximus’ have the same causal history, that these two sentences will be equivalent.
However, the meta-propositional view predicts the opposite, for their analyses are as follows:
(A) ~Ǝx(x is a proposition and x is expressed by ‘Maximus exists’)
(B) ~Ǝx(x is a proposition and x is expressed by ‘Julius exists’)
These are inequivalent because, once again, they are about two distinct sentences. Thus, the
meta-propositional view (so-characterized) makes the wrong semantic prediction.
So much for the meta-propositional view. I will now discuss what I believe is
fundamentally wrong with most of the criticisms of metalinguistic approaches, offer a general
strategy for making a Metalinguistic Strategy plausible, and then explore how such a plausible
metalinguistic view has been worked out by several philosophers.

IV. Towards a Robust Metalinguistic Strategy
The fundamental problem with the above criticisms of metalinguistic approaches is this:
They all take the relevant metalinguistic entity, the one that fails to refer, to be a syntactical
word-type. Once you assume this, a metalinguistic strategy becomes unworkable—indeed, I
believe all of the aforementioned arguments are legitimate if one assumes that a metalinguistic
strategy entails such an assumption. However, it need not. Before offering the general strategy
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for constructing a workable statement of the position that rejects that the relevant lexical entity
that fails to refer is a word-type, though, let’s look at just how exactly this debilitates the view.
Consider the (tragic) negative existential “Batman does not exist”. As we saw, such a
negative existential, on the naïve view, gets the following analysis:
(B1) ‘Batman’ does not refer.
One of the objections to such an analysis was that (B2) as follows would be contingent, whereas
(B3) would be necessary, though they should be equivalent on the naïve view:
(B2) If Batman does not exist, then ‘Batman’ does not refer.
(B3) If ‘Batman’ does not refer, then ‘Batman’ does not refer.
We saw that (B2) was contingent because there are possible worlds in which Batman doesn’t
exist but the term ‘Batman’ still refers (say, to Bane). Now, note that this objection essentially
depends on the above assumption: That ‘Batman’ is a syntactic word-type—and by this I mean
that it is individuated by its syntactical structure (that is, in terms of its syntactic type, any
utterance or inscription of the term is an instance of that type, even if it has a different referent.
This is the sense in which I am “using the same name” when I talk of the superhero and when I
talk of my pet lizard whom I named ‘Batman’). If it is this syntactic word-type that we are
claiming doesn’t refer, then of course it may have referred in spite of the nonexistence of
Batman—the word-type ‘Batman’ can be used to refer to whoever (even his mortal nemesis,
Bane).
Now consider the objection from negative existentials featuring different names, but that
seem semantically equivalent. For example:
(S1) Santa Claus does not exist.
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(S2) Father Christmas does not exist.
Intuitively, these are equivalent. But once again, the naïve view predicts they are not, for their
respective translations are:
(S1’) ‘Santa Claus’ does not refer.
(S2’) ‘Father Christmas’ does not refer.
Now note that this objection also essentially depends on the syntactic word-type assumption:
That we are speaking of the syntactic word-types ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ lacking
referents.
Finally, consider the objection that the following conditional is also contingent (the
converse of the previous conditional):
(C) If ‘Batman’ does not refer, then Batman does not exist.
As discussed before, this conditional is straightforwardly contingent: There are possible worlds
in which ‘Batman’ does not refer, but in which Batman yet exists. Again, the contingency of the
conditional hinges on assuming that we are speaking of some word-type individuated by syntax,
‘Batman’, lacking a referent.
I submit, however, that we need only reject the “ syntactic word-type assumption” in
order to get around all three of these objections. Instead of saying that it is some syntactic wordtype that is failing to refer, we should rather say that it is terms individuated by their use that are
failing to refer. Let us call such terms individuated by use “functional word-types”, and denote
them by ‘Nf’. If we consider then, say, ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ not with respect to
their syntactical type, but with respect to their use type, we will see them as “the same term”.
That is, Santa Clausf = Father Christmasf. They are the same term in that they are “functionally
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equivalent”, or “use-equivalent”84. Equipped with this notion of a functional word-type, we can
get around the three objections as follows.
First, the objection from the inequivalence of “If N does not exist, then ‘N’ does not
refer” and “If ‘N’ does refer, then ‘N’ does not refer”. The objection was that the former is
contingent whereas the latter is necessary. If we replace ‘N’ in the first conditional with the
functional word-type ‘Nf’, then we get the correct modal analysis: “If N does not exist, then Nf
does not refer” is necessary. This can be seen when one considers that, if the individual named
doesn’t exist, then it’s trivially true that the name you used to refer to that individual doesn’t
refer. The objection that the name might refer to some other individual in spite of N’s
nonexistence is blocked here, because such a name would be functionally inequivalent to Nf .
Next, the objection from negative existentials with different, but apparently equivalent,
names. Recall that the naïve metalinguistic strategy had to take ‘Father Christmas does not exist’
and ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ as semantically distinct—one is about the name ‘Father
Christmas’ not referring, and the other ‘Santa Claus’ not referring. However, if we consider
‘Santa’ and ‘Father Christmas’ according to their functional word-type, it is clear that ‘Santa
Clausf = Father Christmasf’. If we designate the functional word-type that is instantiated by both
of these names with ‘Cf’, then we get a unifying metalinguistic meaning and truth-condition: ‘C f
does not refer’.
Finally, consider the objection from the contingency of “If ‘Batman’ does not refer, then
Batman does not exist”, when it should be necessary (the antecedent being equivalent to the
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It is of course natural to think of ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ as different terms. Because of this, it’s
important to keep in mind that I am here merely stipulating that they are the “same term” in the sense of bearing a
relation of use-equivalence to each other.
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consequent, on a metalinguistic view). This one is trickier than the others, but I believe the ‘N f’
framework can work here as well. Consider that, if ‘Batman’ as we use it (say, the “superherouse”), that is ‘Batmanf’, does not refer, then there isn’t any sense in which Batman might have
existed85. This point is subtle. To see it, it is important to consider the nature of Direct Reference
and the nature of counterfactual reflection. On DR theory, the semantic value of a name is simply
its referent. Because of this, as we have seen, a name will lack any content in the absence of a
referent. When deploying an empty name in reflecting on counterfactual situations, then, there
will be no definite state of affairs being considered in using that name. Consider, for example,
that we discover Shakespeare never existed. Someone may say “Well, Shakespeare doesn’t exist,
but he might have!” What, on DR theory, could this mean? Under what circumstances would
Shakespeare have existed, if the name itself lacks any content? Who is it we are picking out in
this other possible world using the name ‘Shakespeare’ and saying that he exists in that world? It
may be helpful to consider how counterfactual reflection works for definite descriptions, in order
to see the contrast. For a definite description, such as “The first Prime Minister”, when we
consider a counterfactual situation using that phrase we have definite identity conditions for who
will be the first Prime Minister in the world considered 86: Whoever exemplifies the property
‘being the first Prime Minister’. We also get a clear identity condition when deploying a filled
name in a counterfactual situation: Whoever is identical, in that world, to the individual denoted
by that name in the actual world. No such identity conditions are available when we deploy an
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worlds, as opposed to a problem about the individuation conditions at a particular world, which is presently being
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empty name, so there isn’t any sense in which we can meaningfully reflect on the possible
existence of some definite individual.
It is in this sense, then, that the conditional is necessarily true: If ‘Batmanf’ does not refer,
then Batman does not exist87. I think that the appearance of contingency here can be explained
by the fact that, when a name is full, the conditional will indeed be contingent: If there is such a
person as Batman, then we can proceed to meaningfully speak of him in counterfactual
situations, even counterfactuals in which the name ‘Batman’ doesn’t exist, or is not used in the
way in which we use it.
Because of these considerations, I believe that such a general strategy for reworking the
metalinguistic approach is promising. Further, there has been a kind of metalinguistic view,
consistent with DR theory and the causal-historical theory of reference, which has been
developed by several philosophers and appears to flesh out this general idea well. In particular, it
gives us the conditions under which our Nf s will fail to refer. It is this kind of metalinguistic
view that I believe is the correct analysis of negative existentials. I will call it the “CausalHistorical Metalinguistic View”, and it will now be discussed.

V. The Causal-Historical Metalinguistic View
The Causal-Historical Metalinguistic view (hereafter simply TCV) finds its initial
statement in Keith Donnellan’s 1974 paper “Speaking of Nothing” 88. Donnellan first points out
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In this conditional, what’s true specifically is that if ‘Batman’ does not refer in our world then Batman’s
existence, considered at our world, isn’t possible in any other world.
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Keith Donnellan, “Speaking of Nothing,” Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 3-31.
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that, given the causal-historical theory reference, the truth conditions for “singular expressions”
are (a) that an individual is “appropriately related” to the name historically, and (b) that the
individual instantiates the property expressed by the predicate. It follows naturally according to
Donnellan, then, that the truth conditions for a negative existential are just that there is no
individual appropriately causally-historically related to the name.
When a name lacks such a causal-historical relation to an individual, Donnellan says that
name ends in a “historical block”. The truth condition for negative existentials may then be
stated as follows: A negative existential is true iff the causal history of the name that occurs in
the negative existential ends in a block. Further, he points out that there are various ways in
which it could happen that a name ends in a block: The introduction of a fictional character by
parents (when, for example, they tell their child of Santa Claus); a writer mistakenly attributing
various writings to a single individual89; someone being under a visual hallucination and naming
the purported-object of the hallucination90, and so on.
Donnellan addresses two possible objections to this account. First, there may be two
usages of the same name in a language, so how do we distinguish the causal-historical truth
conditions? To this Donnellan replies much in the same way I did above: One need only
distinguish the names in terms of their “characteristic usages”. So, by way of example, we would
have ‘Beethoven1’ for the composer, and ‘Beethoven2’ for the dog (in my former terminology,
these are distinct because they are distinct functional word-types, though they are identical
syntactic word-types). Second, there is the objection that people can express the same true
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Such as a certain fringe view about the works of Shakespeare.
Although, interestingly, Kripke thinks that hallucinatory objects may themselves represent a unique ontological
category, analogous to fictional entities. See Reference and Existence, Lecture IV.
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negative existential in different languages, using different names. If so, how could the truth
conditions be identical when they have differing causal histories? To this Donnellan’s reply is
simple: If these names were indeed functionally equivalent, then their histories must merge at
some point, “if one goes back far enough”. If, for example, we recognized the English “Santa
Claus” and the German “Der Weihnachtsmann” as being intertranslatable

91

, and thus

semantically equivalent, then it must be that the histories of those names merge at some point in
the past92.
Donnellan’s basic idea has influenced and been developed by the philosophers John Perry
and Anthony Everett. Perry calls his developing of the idea a “reflexive-referential” theory—
reflexive, he says, because the truth conditions for negative existentials are conditions on the
utterance itself (much like what I said constitutes a view’s being “metalinguistic”). Perry’s theory
is fairly nuanced and technical, but the basic idea is this: With every proper name, we can
identify its causal-historical “network”, which is to be identified with its linguistic history.
Networks always have an origin, but do not always originate with an individual (as Donnellan
said, they may end in a “block”). There is a type of content associated with names, then, that we
may call their “network content”. The network content of a name may sometimes contribute to
the truth-conditions of the sentences in which it occurs, and Perry gives existential claims as a
prime example. When I say “N exists”, Perry claims that the truth conditions are given by some
fact about the network; namely, that the “N-network” has an individual at its origin. The
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I have heard that this isn’t strictly the case, but let’s ignore such translation-related nuances for the sake of
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This, however, does not entail that they must have been the same name at some time in the past. Histories can
merge in less straightforward ways: Someone may tell me of Bigfoot, and I decide to call him ‘Little John’—if so,
the causal chain initiated by my introduction of ‘Little John’ will be a part of the larger causal chain of ‘Bigfoot’
usages.
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network-related truth-conditions of the negation of “N exists”, then, are that the N-network lack
an individual at its origin.
Everett argues along similar lines, but where Perry talks of “networks” Everett talks of
“referential frameworks”. Like Perry’s networks, Everett’s referential frameworks are the
collective linguistic histories, with all of its branches and sub-branches, of a name stretching all
the way back to the name’s introduction. Everett says that if at the “base” of the framework there
is an individual referred to, that framework as a “referential source”. However, Everett points out
that even if a framework lacks a referential source, it may still have at its base a reference-fixing
source. And a framework may grow up over time out of such a reference-fixing event just as it
may grow out of the dubbing of an actual object. To see this, consider the example of visual
hallucination: Say I am wandering through the woods and believe I see a massive creature
lurking. I proceed to name the creature, whatever it is, “Solomon”, and a framework of usages of
that name grows out of that reference-fixing event. Unbeknownst to me, however, there never
was a Solomon: I had just recently consumed a hallucination-inducing herb. Solomon does not
exist. But of course, this did not prevent a genuine referential framework from growing up out of
the event—to this day, visitors to the forest speak of the lurking Solomon.
Everett uses these ideas to explain how (1) certain distinct empty names can be “about”
the same thing, and (2) certain distinct empty names can be “about” different things. For
example, if DR theory is true, then in what sense can we say that two statements such as “Santa
Claus is jolly” and “Father Christmas is merry” are about the same thing if there is nothing for
them to be about? Here Everett invokes his technical notion of “thin-aboutness”. Everett says
that two things are “thinly about the same thing” if they “share a common framework source”. It
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is in this “thin” sense of aboutness, Everett claims, that statements about Father Christmas and
Santa Claus are about the same thing.
With respect to (2), there seem to be statements featuring empty names that are about
different things. But how can this be, given that there’s nothing for them to be about—or, put
another way, given that they both have the same semantic value,

. Consider, for example, the

statements “Romulus is brave” and “Spock is brave”. If they have any semantic values at all,
their semantic values may be given by the “gappy propositions” they express: <
and <

, braveness >

, braveness >. They both have the null set in their subject-position (because they are

empty), and the property ‘braveness’ in the predicate-position. How, then, to distinguish them?
We can distinguish them if we consider what they are (in Everett’s phraseology) “thinly” about,
or (in Perry’s phraseology) if we consider their “network” content. TCV, then, gives us insight
not only into negative existentials, but also into questions concerning the sort of content that
distinguishes or unites various occurrences of empty names in normal subject-predicate
sentences.
As a final point in favor of TCV, recall Kripke’s objection from belief-reports. We may
report, for example, that the Greeks believed Zeus existed without committing ourselves to the
Greeks having any beliefs about the term ‘Zeus’ (that, in this case, ‘Zeus’ refers). The present
TCV account has a straightforward response to this problem: In committing ourselves to the fact
that the Greeks believed Zeus existed, we are not committing ourselves to anything about the
Greek’s believing something about the term (considered syntactically) ‘Zeus’, but we are
committing ourselves to the belief that they believed whatever functionally equivalent term they
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used (call it Zeusf ) refers. And the basis of this successful reference is given by Zeusf having a
referential origin.
Next, I’d like to address a certain objection to metalinguistic views that doesn’t just apply
to the naïve view, but would also apply to our present TCV version of the view.

VI. The ‘Mention’ Objection
It has been argued by philosophers such as Kripke, Evans, and Kroon93 that there should
be the following restriction on any analysis of existential or negative existential statements: The
singular term must be analyzed as being used rather than mentioned. It’s often unclear just why,
exactly, this restriction should be placed on the analysis. However, Kroon gives at least two
prima facie reasons: First, he claims that viewing the term as used rather than mentioned passes
the “surface grammar” test. The motivation here seems to be that, at least ceteris paribus, we
should avoid giving an analysis that is removed from the straightforward grammatical structure
of the sentence—preserving as much of the notion as embodied in ordinary language as possible.
Second, Kroon argues that viewing the term as used rather than mentioned respects the
anaphora surrounding such terms in many contexts. A term is “anaphoric” if its meaning is
parasitic on the meaning of some prior term. For example, in “Joe went to school. He picked up
some books.”, “He” is anaphoric, as its semantics are parasitic on the previous occurrence of
“Joe”. Consider, then, a context like the following: “Spock doesn’t exist. He was a brilliant

See: Kripke, Reference and Existence, Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982)., and Fred Kroon, “ ‘Disavowal Through Commitment’ Theories of Negative Existentials,” in Empty
Names, Fiction and The Puzzles of Non-existence, ed. Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (Stanford: CSLI
Publications, 2000).
93
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Vulcan in ‘Star Trek’, though.” In such a context, it’s clear that “he” is anaphoric on “Spock”.
However, how can it be, if the original negative existential is not about an individual, but rather
about a term? The metalinguistic translation of the previous context would be: “‘Spockf’ doesn’t
refer94. He was a brilliant Vulcan in ‘Star Trek’, though.” Clearly, ‘he’ here can’t be anaphoric
on the term ‘Spockf’.
Despite these considerations, I do not believe that such a restriction is legitimate.
Consider first the “surface grammar” motivation. It seems that one of the main lessons of the
history of the philosophy of language has been that surface grammar is often misleading. Indeed,
one of the field’s most successful and fruitful results is founded on such a rejection of surface
grammar: Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. Russell’s key insight was that statements that
appear to essentially denote some definite individual, of the form “The F is G”, are despite their
surface grammar existential quantifications. Further, if surface grammar were a legitimate test
for a philosophical-semantical theory, then we would have to give ground to the Meinongian,
endorser of nonexistent entities, who takes the surface grammar of negative existentials at facevalue: Statements of the form “N does not exist” have the grammatical form of subject-predicate
sentences, and thus the Meinongian takes us to be designating some entity and predicating
nonexistence of it. It seems, then, that although the “surface grammar test” should be a prima
facie guide for philosophical-semantical theories, it surely shouldn’t be a restriction on such
theories.
Now to the question of anaphora. It seems that how one addresses this question will vary,
in part, depending on what the metalinguistic strategist thinks about fiction. For example, in the
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In virtue of ending in a block.
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previous example involving Spock, the endorser of Abstract Object Theory may interpret it as
follows: The initial statement of Spock’s nonexistence is not strict, but is rather something more
like “There is no one sufficiently like Spock as portrayed in Star Trek”. The subsequent
anaphoric “he” would then (because we wouldn’t want to call the abstract object “he”) introduce
a new context, a context within a pretense. The anaphora of “he”, then, would hinge on the
ambiguity between the meta-fictional sense of “Spock” and the object-fictional sense of
“Spock”. It should be understood in such contexts, though, that speakers are sensitive to such
ambiguities and accept the anaphora on their basis. This is, at least, one route that might be
taken.
For simplicity’s sake, though, let’s eliminate contexts of fiction and see how the
metalinguisitic strategist may treat anaphora in another context. Consider a context in which
someone says “Did you hear? Aristotle never existed! Shame, really—he was my favorite
philosopher.” Here ‘Aristotle’ is empty, is featured in a negative existential, and the subsequent
“he” in anaphoric. What is the metalinguistic strategist to say? First, let’s keep in mind that she
will give the following analysis of ‘Aristotle never existed’: “‘Aristotle f’ doesn’t refer”. Now the
aforementioned would look something like “Did you hear? ‘Aristotlef’ doesn’t refer! Shame,
really—he was my favorite philosopher”. My first intuition here is to simply ask: Does the
anaphoric “he” here really seem that out of place—that inappropriate? Beyond a raw appeal to
intuition, though, the metalinguistic strategist may something along the following lines:
The anaphoric “he” here is relying upon a previous semantic convention associated with
‘Aristotle’—a convention like: The name ‘Aristotle’ is filled, so one may apply anaphoric terms
to it. That is, there was a previous presumption that the name was not empty, so like with any
68

filled name, it was strictly appropriate to apply anaphoric terms to it. Once it is discovered that
‘Aristotle’ is in fact empty, speakers may continue to exploit this convention or presumption in
order to speak loosely about, for example, features they still or used to associate with the name—
in this case, ‘my favorite philosopher’. Although the speaker in question of course knows now
that there is no “he” to be the referent of that description, she nonetheless continues to exploit the
previous convention that permits her to talk as if the name has a referent—and this to convey
some bit of information more quickly and conveniently, such as “It’s a shame, all of those works
authored under the name ‘Aristotle’ were my favorites. Now I know they were written by several
independent hacks, under the name ‘Aristotle’” (or whatever the case happened to be).
Anaphora is a complex and variegated phenomenon, but it seems there is no in-principle
reason the metalinguistic strategist cannot deal with it by appealing to pragmatic considerations
such as the ones just mentioned. The case of anaphora is at least not an obvious, knock-down
argument against metalinguistic approaches.

VII. Pretense and The Causal-Historical Metalinguistic View
Although I have argued that surface grammar should not be a restriction on an analysis of
negative existentials, it still would be helpful if we could explain the prima facie appearance that
we are engaged in normal subject-predicate discourse when uttering such sentences. I believe the
endorser of TCV can incorporate a certain insight of philosophers Evans, Kroon, and Walton in
order to do just that 95.
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Evans, Kroon, and Walton have all endorsed a pretense account of negative existentials.
As Evans put it, we should liken negative existentials to “…a person who makes a move within a
pretense to express the fact that it is a pretense”. He gives the example of someone running out
on stage in the middle of a play and saying, “This scaffold and these buildings are only props!”
More to the present point, one may think of children playing a game of Cowboys and Indians,
when all of a sudden, upon realizing one of the children is too caught up in the game and
frightened, another child says “Jim, don’t worry—those Indians over there don’t exist!”. In both
of these cases, the phrases “This scaffold and these buildings” and “Those Indians over there”
are moves within the pretense. In reality, of course, there are no buildings, scaffolds, or Indians
in these cases—but the participants in the game of make believe exploit the assumption that they
are in order to convey that they are not. Kroon calls this “disavowal through commitment”.
According to these thinkers, then, a negative existential should be seen in the following
way: When we utter “N does not exist”, we are pretending that “N” refers, assuming a
convention under which it would make sense to deploy it in a subject-predicate sentence, in order
to convey that it does not in fact refer—much like saying “Those Indians over there don’t
exist”96. It is clear on this model how one explains the appearance of use: One is using the term
in the context of the pretense, in order to convey that it is not, indeed cannot, be used (because it
is empty).
Interestingly, Kroon and Evans, at least, have both explicitly rejected the idea that empty
names are to be seen as mentioned in negative existentials. However, note that they put a
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Walton thinks that the game of make-believe involved in our usage of negative existentials is actually a
Meinongian game, in which we pretend that there is a certain domain of objects which have the property of
nonexistence.
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metalinguistic truth condition on the negative existential: That the name, or that particular
utterance of the name, fails to refer. As Walton put it, a statement such as “Neptune does not
exist” is more fundamentally to say something like “Neptune: that was unsuccessful”. If so, then
it’s difficult to see just what, exactly, the issue between the metalinguistic approach and the
pretense approach to negative existentials is. For even the endorser of TCV would presumably
agree that, for whatever reason, we deploy sentences in which the names are superficially used to
get across this ultimately metalinguistic truth condition, or information. I want to submit, then,
that the pretense account of negative existentials and TCV are actually complementary: The
Causal-Historical Metalinguistic View gives us the truth conditions for negative existentials, and
the pretense account gives us the pragmatic device by which we convey these truth conditions.
Given that it is developed in the causal-historical way just outlined, and that it is
supplemented by pretense views, I believe that a Metalinguistic Strategy is the most promising
for dealing with negative existentials. Having now completed the review and analysis of the
various approach DR Theorists have taken regarding the problem of empty names, I will now
conclude by summarizing and making some general observations.

VIII. Conclusion
We began with a cluster of problems generated by four facts: (1) The phenomenon of
empty names, (2) Direct Reference theory, (3) the principle of compositionality, and (4) the truth
conditions for subject-predicate sentences featuring singular terms. Given that a name is empty,
and that its semantic value could only be its referent, the principle of compositionality dictated
that no unique complete proposition could be expressible by sentences in which such names
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occurred. Further, even if we took their semantic significance for granted, we still faced the
problem of how some such sentences managed to be true: Their truthmakers would seem to be
constituted by the denotation of the subject term exemplifying the property expressed by the
predicate term. Additionally, we saw that there are various types of sentence featuring empty
names that may, in the end, require different analyses: (1) Basic subject-predicate sentences,
such as “Romulus founded Rome” , negative existentials such as “Santa Claus does not exist”,
and names as they occur in fictional contexts, such as “Spock is from planet Vulcan”.
The Pragmatic Strategists attempted to deal with these cases uniformly. They theorized
that our intuitions regarding the semantic significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences
was based not on the propositions (or lackthereof) they literally expressed, but rather on
conversationally implicated descriptive propositions. So, for example, our intuitions regarding
the significance of a statement such as “Santa Claus is jolly” are ultimately based on some
associated descriptive proposition, such as “The fat man from the North Pole who brings
presents every year is jolly”. There were, however, important objections to the view—objections
that left me with the conclusion that the view, while having its virtues, was too problematic.
Next we saw how DR theorists have attempted to deal with the phenomenon of empty
names in fictional contexts. There were two main views: Pretense Theory, and Abstract Object
Theory. Pretense Theory attempted to explain fiction as a sort of exercise in make-believe—an
exercise, or language game, in which we pretend that the requisite semantic conditions are
fulfilled by the sentences being used. If so, then one such condition we are pretending is fulfilled
is the condition that the names involved have a referent. Our intuitions regarding the significance
of names in such contexts is then explained by our realizing that it is part of the pretense of the
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fiction that they are indeed significant, when in reality they are not. Abstract Object Theory,
however, arose out of a consideration of certain sentences involving fictional names, but that did
not occur within fiction: meta-fictional sentences, such as “Sherlock Holmes is the most famous
literary detective”. Sentences such as these are not part of any pretense, they are not “true in the
stories”, but are rather straightforward statements about reality. And many such sentences
seemed to commit us to quantifying over such fictional characters—fictional characters being
conceived of us a sort of abstract object. Further, the fact that we bear certain attitude-relations
towards such characters was taken as additional evidence for their existence. This class of
sentences, at least, was then explained by these DR theorists by claiming that they do not in fact
feature empty names: their semantic values are the abstract objects they refer to. In the end, I
found Abstract Object Theory a compelling and natural explanation of meta-fictional discourse,
though had doubts about whether it could be extended to account for object-fictional discourse,
as Nathan Salmon thought it may. Such an extension, though, is unnecessary, given that Pretense
Theory and Abstract Object Theory are consistent with one another—one may be taken to
explain object-fictional, and the other meta-fictional discourse.
Finally, in this chapter, I explored and assessed the Metalinguistic Strategy for coping
with empty names. A naïve metalinguistic view and the meta-propositional view were analyzed
and rejected, and a more robust causal-historical version of the view was developed in their
place. It was argued that such a causal-historical version could cope with not only negative
existentials, but with the sense that other basic subject-predicate sentences had some sort of
content, despite our recognition of their emptiness. For example, that sentences featuring ‘Santa
Claus’ and ‘Father Christmas’ share content, whereas sentences featuring ‘Remus’ and ‘Bigfoot’
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have divergent content. This was explained in terms of Perry’s notion of “network” content, and
Everett’s notion of “thin aboutness”. Finally, regarding negative existentials, I argued that such
an account, in order to explain the appearance of use, ought to be supplemented by the pretense
accounts given by philosophers such as Evans, Kroon and Walton: Pretense explains the
pragmatic device by which we convey a metalinguistic truth condition.
My analysis of the various strategies and approaches to empty names from the
perspective of Direct Reference may then be summarized as follows: For the case of fiction,
meta-fictional sentences and certain attitude-contexts ought to be analyzed in the way Abstract
Object Theory proposes. On the other hand, object-fictional sentences seem best understood on
the model of pretense—given that, as was argued, an alternative account such as Salmon’s is
problematic. For the case of negative existentials, I argued for the sort of causal-historical
metalinguistic account developed by philosophers such as Donnellan, Perry, and Everett—
supplemented by a notion of pretense. And, finally, the same sort of analysis was to explain the
content of non-fictional normal subject-predicate sentences: Our retaining the intuition that such
sentences remain meaningful, despite the emptiness of the names they feature, is that they retain
their “network” content.
In the end, the one strategy that could have given a unified account of empty names was
rejected: The Pragmatic Strategy. However, the philosopher must always make his choice
relative to various theoretical virtues. In this case, I purchased the explanatory power of a
disparate set of views at the price of the explanatory simplicity of the pragmatic view. Of course,
these positions themselves are not without their problems. I believe, however, that given the
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current state of things, the most promising lines of defense against the problem of empty names
for DR theorists are those just outlined, explained, and defended.
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